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Abstract
Differential privacy is a promising approach to privacy preserving data analysis with a well-
developed theory for functions. Despite recent work on implementing systems that aim to
provide differential privacy, the problem of formally verifying that these systems have differen-
tial privacy has not been adequately addressed. This paper presents the first results towards
automated verification of source code for differentially private interactive systems. We develop
a formal probabilistic automaton model of differential privacy for systems by adapting prior
work on differential privacy for functions. The main technical result of the paper is a sound
proof technique based on a form of probabilistic bisimulation relation for proving that a system
modeled as a probabilistic automaton satisfies differential privacy. The novelty lies in the way
we track quantitative privacy leakage bounds using a relation family instead of a single relation.
We illustrate the proof technique on a representative automaton motivated by PINQ, an im-
plemented system that is intended to provide differential privacy. To make our proof technique
easier to apply to realistic systems, we prove a form of refinement theorem and apply it to
show that a refinement of the abstract PINQ automaton also satisfies our differential privacy
definition. Finally, we begin the process of automating our proof technique by providing an
algorithm for mechanically checking a restricted class of relations from the proof technique.
∗This work was partially supported by the U.S. Army Research Office contract on Perpetually Available and
Secure Information Systems (DAAD19-02-1-0389) to Carnegie Mellon CyLab, the NSF Science and Technology
Center TRUST, the NSF CyberTrust grant “Privacy, Compliance and Information Risk in Complex Organizational
Processes,” and the AFOSR MURI “Collaborative Policies and Assured Information Sharing.”
1
1 Introduction
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy is a promising approach to privacy-preserving data
analysis (see [Dwo08, Dwo10] for surveys). This work is motivated by statistical data sets that
contain personal information about a large number of individuals (e.g., census or health data). In
such a scenario, a trusted party collects personal information from a representative sample with
the goal of releasing statistics about the underlying population while simultaneously protecting
the privacy of the individuals. In an interactive setting, an untrusted data examiner poses queries
that the trusted party evaluates over the data set and appropriately modifies to protect privacy
before sending the result to the examiner. Differential privacy formalizes this operation in terms of a
probabilistic sanitization function that takes the data set as input. Differential privacy requires that
the probability of producing an output should not change much irrespective of whether information
about any particular individual is in the data set or not. The amount of change is measured in
terms of a privacy leakage bound—a non-negative real number ǫ, where a smaller ǫ indicates a
higher level of privacy. The insight here is that since only a limited amount of additional privacy
risk is incurred by joining a data set, individuals may decide to join the data set if there are societal
benefits from doing so (e.g., aiding cancer research). A consequence and strength of the definition is
that the privacy guarantee holds irrespective of the auxiliary information and computational power
available to an adversary. Previous work on algorithms for sanitization functions and the analysis
of these algorithms in light of the trade-offs between privacy and utility (answering useful queries
accurately without compromising privacy) has provided firm foundations for differential privacy
(e.g. [DMNS06, Dwo06, MT07, NRS07, BLR08, Dwo08, Dwo09, GRS09, Dwo10, DNPR10]).
In a different direction, these sanitization algorithms are being implemented for inclusion in data
management systems. For example, pinq resembles a sql database, but instead of providing the
actual answer to sql queries, it provides the output of a differentially private sanitization function
operating on the actual answer [McS09]. Another such system, airavat, manages distributed data
and performs MapReduce computations in a cloud computing environment while using differential
privacy as a basis for declassifying data in a mandatory access control framework [RRS+10]. Both
of these are interactive systems that use sanitization functions as a component: they interact with
both the providers of sensitive data and untrusted data examiners, store the data, and perform
computations on the data some of which apply sanitization functions. Even if we assume that
these systems correctly implement the sanitization functions to give differential privacy, this is not
sufficient to conclude that the guarantees of differential privacy apply to the system as a whole.
For the differential privacy guarantee of functions to scale to the whole of the implemented system,
the system must properly handle the sensitive data and never provide channels through which
untrusted examiners can infer information about it without first sanitizing it to the degree dictated
by the privacy error bound.
Formal Methods for Differential Privacy. We work toward reconciling formal analysis tech-
niques with the growing body of work on abstract frameworks or implemented systems that use
differential privacy as a building block. While prior work in the area has provided a type system
for proving that a non-interactive program is a differentially private sanitization function [RP10],
we know of no formal methods for proving that an interactive system using such functions has
differential privacy. Applying formal methods to interactive systems ensures that these systems
properly manage their data bases and interactions with untrusted users.
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Formal verification that an interactive system provides privacy requires that the system be
modeled in such a way that the correspondence between the system and model is evident and the
model includes all relevant behavior of the system. Once formal verification is done on the model,
one can assert with the confidence afforded by formal proofs that the system as implemented
and modeled preserves privacy in addition to knowing that the algorithms implemented by the
system preserve privacy. For formal verification to scale to large programs with complex models,
the creation of the model and the verification of its privacy must be mechanized, preferably in a
compositional manner.
To this end, we present an automaton model for which the correspondence between the au-
tomaton and the implementation of a system is so plainly evident that the automaton could be
automatically extracted from source code as is done with model checking [CGP00]. For this model,
we introduce a form of compositional reasoning that allows us to separate the proof that a function
gives differential privacy from the proof that the system correctly uses that function. Furthermore,
we present a proof technique for such models that is amenable to mechanization and an algorithm
that can be used to check that the proof technique is correctly applied to a model.
Our effort can be likened to those efforts in the security community that involve the devel-
opment of formal models for cryptographic protocols and the accompanying verification meth-
ods [ST07, BPW07, CCK+08]. These works use stylized proofs with multiple levels of abstraction
and compositionality to enable scaling mechanical checking of these proofs to the size of realistic
systems. Making these proofs shorter or more readable for humans than their informal counterparts
is not a goal.
Contributions. We work with a special class of probabilistic I/O automata that allow us to
model interactive systems in terms of states and probabilistic transitions between states. These
automata provide us with the needed expressive power for modeling how data is stored in an inter-
nal state of an implementation, and how it is updated through computations, some of which apply
differentially private sanitization functions on data. In Section 3.1, we present this probabilistic
automaton model and our differential privacy definition for probabilistic automata, which we call
differential noninterference due to the similarities it has with the information flow property non-
interference [GM82]. Indeed, when applied to interactive systems, both differential privacy and
noninterference privacy aim at restricting information leakage about sensitive data by requiring
that the system produces similar outputs for inputs that differ only in sensitive data. However,
differential privacy allows for the degree of similarity to decrease as the inputs diverge, making it
a more flexible requirement.
As formal methods can only scale to large systems with compositional reasoning, in Section 4,
we examine the ability to perform compositional reasoning with our formal model. We show that
correctness proof of sanitization functions may be separated from the correctness proof of the
system that uses them.
Our main technical contribution, presented in Section 5, is a proof technique for establishing that
a system has differential noninterference. Our technique allows the global property of differential
noninterference to be proved from local information about transitions between states. This proof
technique was inspired by the unwinding proof technique originally developed for proving that a
system has noninterference [GM84].
Our unwinding technique is also similar to bisimulation-based proof techniques as both uses
a notion of “similarity” of states with respect to their observable behavior. Unlike traditional
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bisimulation relations for probabilistic automata, the unwinding relation is defined over the states
of a single automaton with the intention of establishing the similarity of two states where one
is obtainable from the other by the input of an additional data point. Moreover, the notion
of similarity is approximate, which is in keeping with the definition of differential privacy. An
unwinding proof involves finding a relation family indexed by the set of possible values of the
privacy leakage bound ǫ, rather than a single relation. This departure from traditional probabilistic
bisimulations is needed to track the maximum privacy leakage tolerable from a given state in the
execution. We prove the soundness of our proof technique in Theorem 2, which roughly states
that the existence of appropriate ǫ-unwinding families for an automaton M implies that M has
ǫ-differential noninterference.
As in other formal proof techniques of this nature, the real creativity in doing the proofs with
our technique goes into defining the unwinding family. Unsurprisingly, the rest consists of repeated,
routine applications of basic arguments showing that the defined relation between states is preserved
by transitions of the system. In Section 6, this quality enables us to develop an algorithm to check
whether a given relation family is an unwinding family, thereby automating proofs for differential
noninterference modulo the definition of the relations. We prove that the algorithm soundly runs
in polynomial time: it will only return true if the automaton has ǫ-differential noninterference
(Theorems 4 and 5).
To motivate our work, we start by presenting a system similar to pinq. We refer to the example
system throughout our paper as we model it in our formalism and use our unwinding technique and
algorithm to verify that it has differential noninterference. As pinq may be configured to use any
set of sanitization functions, we present an automaton Mex1 that is parametric in the sanitization
functions that it uses. We show two methods for proving differential noninterference for any correct
instantiation of Mex1 with differentially private sanitization functions: by using the composition
method presented in Section 4, and by using our unwinding verification algorithm. This second
method illustrates the applicability of our algorithm in proving differential noninterference for
interesting automata.
Along the way, we find interactions between a bounded memory model and differential privacy
of interest beyond formal verification. In particular, we find the inability to store an unbounded
number of data points results in doubling the privacy leakage.
We finish with Section 7 covering related work and Section 8 presenting future work and con-
clusions.
2 Background and Motivation
2.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy formalizes the idea that a private process should not reveal too much information
about a single person. A data point represents all the information collected about an individual
(or other entity that must be protected). A multiset (bag) of data points forms a data set. A
sanitization function κ processes the data set and returns a result to the untrusted data examiner
that should probabilistically not change whether or not a single data point is in the data set.
Dwork [Dwo06] states differential privacy as follows:
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). A randomized function κ has ǫ-differential privacy iff for all
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data sets B1 and B2 differing on at most one element, and for all S ⊆ range(κ),
Pr[κ(B1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) ∗ Pr[κ(B2) ∈ S]
Formally, multisets B1 and B2 differ on at most one element iff either B1 = B2 or there exists
d such that B1 ∪ {d} = B2 or B2 ∪ {d} = B1. Note that the above definition is well-defined only if
range(κ) is countable.
Differential privacy has many pleasing properties. For example, if B1 and B2 differ by n dat-
apoints instead of just one, then the probabilities of κ(B1) and κ(B2) being in a set S will be
within a factor of exp(n ∗ ǫ) of one another [MT07, Corollary 4]. Furthermore, a function that
sequentially applies n functions each with ǫ-differential privacy and provides all of their outputs is
an (n ∗ ǫ)-differentially private function [MT07, Corollary 5].
Privacy Mechanisms. As shown in the original work on differential privacy, given a statistic
f that can be computed of the data sets Bi, one can construct a sanitization function κf from f
by having κf add noise to the value of f(Bi) where the noise is drawn from a Laplace distribu-
tion [DMNS06]. This is an example of a privacy mechanism, a scheme for converting a statistic
into a sanitization function with differential privacy.
Systems in practice would implement a sanitization function such as κf as a program. As actual
computers have only a bounded amount of memory, the program computing κf must only use a
bounded amount of memory. However, many sanitization functions proposed in the differential
privacy literature, including all sanitization functions constructed using the Laplace privacy mech-
anism, use randomly drawn real numbers, which requires an uncountably infinite number of states.
While such functions can be approximated using a finite number of states (e.g., by using floating
point numbers), it is unclear whether the proofs that these functions have differential privacy carry
over to their approximations.
As we are interested in formally proving that finite systems provide differential privacy, we
limit ourselves to privacy mechanisms that operate over only a finite number of values. One such
mechanism is the Truncated Geometric Mechanism of Ghosh et al. [GRS09], which uses noise drawn
from a bounded, discrete version of the Laplace distribution. As we are interested in applying formal
methods to systems using such mechanisms, we provide an implementation of this mechanism that
runs in expected constant time and proofs about it in Appendix A.
2.2 Motivating Example System
To further motivate and illustrate our work, we provide an example of an interactive system that
uses sanitization functions. Throughout the remainder of this paper, we apply the various formal
methods we develop to prove that it preserves privacy. The system manages data points entered by
data providers and processes requests of data examiners for information by receiving queries and
answering them after sanitizing the answer computed over the data set. The system must apply
the sanitization functions to the data set and interact with the data examiner in a manner that
does not compromise privacy.
Possible source code for one such system is shown in Figure 1. To be concrete, suppose that the
data points are integers and the system handles only two queries. The first produces the output
of the sanitization function count, which provides the number of data points currently in the
data base. The second produces the output of sum, which provides their sum. In both cases,
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01 dPts:= emptyArray(t);
02 numPts := emptyArray(t);
03 for(j:=0; j<t; j++)
04 dPts[j]:= emptyArray(maxPts);
05 numPts[j] := 0;
06 curSlot:=0;
07 while(1)
08 y:=input();
09 if(datapoint(y))
10 if(numPts[curSlot]<maxPts)
11 dPts[curSlot][numPts[curSlot]]:=y;
12 numPts[curSlot]++;
13 else
14 k:=get_sanitization_funct(y);
15 res:=k.compute(dPts);
16 print(res);
17 curSlot:=(curSlot + 1) mod t;
18 delete dPts[curSlot];
19 dPts[curSlot] := emptyArray(maxPts);
20 numPts[curSlot] := 0
Figure 1: Program that tracks data point usage to ensure differential noninterference
the sanitization functions use the Truncated Geometric Mechanism to preserve privacy [GRS09].
(Appendix A.3 provides source code for count and sum.)
Intuitively, the program in Figure 1 keeps an array of t arrays of data points and a variable
curSlot, whose value indicates a (current) slot in the array. If the input is a data point, that data
point is added to the array indexed by curSlot unless that array is full, in which case the data
point is ignored.
If the input is a query, then the query requested by the input is computed on the union of all
the data points collected from all the arrays. Line 15 uses either the implementation of count or
sum to compute the system’s response to the query y where Line 14 selects the correct function.
Furthermore, the index curSlot to one of these arrays is cyclically shifted and the array to which it
now points is replaced with an empty array. Since there are only t slots, this means that each array
will only last for t queries before being deleted. (If t = 0, we take the program to have an array
dPts of length 0, in which case it never stores any data points.) Since each query has ǫ-differential
privacy, this ensures that each data point will only be involved in t ∗ ǫ worth of queries.
Verification. The goal of our work is to formally verify that systems like this one preserve the
privacy of their users. In addition to showing that the sanitization functions count and sum
have differential privacy (a subject of previous work [GRS09]), we study how the system leaks
information about the data points in ways other than through the outputs from these functions.
Indeed, one might expect from the sequential result for differential privacy discussed above [MT07,
Corollary 5], that the system would provide (t ∗ ǫ)-differential privacy. However, due to how the
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system manages data points, it actually only provides (2t ∗ ǫ)-differential privacy as we show later.
Had our goal only been to formally verify the implementations of the sanitization functions
count and sum, it would suffice to use a simple formal model such as that of probabilistic finite-
state automata with no interaction and use a suitable algorithmic technique to verify differential
privacy, which research on Markov chains provides. (We provide further details in Section 4.1.)
However, to verify differential privacy for interactive systems that use privacy mechanism as a
building block as the above system does, we need a more expressive formal model that models the
interaction of the data examiner with the system and the addition of data points to the system
over time. The next section provides such a model.
3 Modeling Interaction for Formal Verification
In this section, we present the basics of the formal framework we use in modeling interactive systems
and show how we can model the example system of Section 2.2 using this formalism. Specifically,
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we introduce a special class of probabilistic I/O automata and present
our definition of differential privacy for this class of probabilistic I/O automata. In Section 3.3 we
model the program of Figure 1 as a probabilistic I/O automaton.
3.1 Automata
We use a simplified version of probabilistic I/O automata (cf. [LSV07]). We define an automaton
in terms of a probabilistic labeled transition system (plts).
Definition 2. A probabilistic labeled transition system (plts) is a tuple L = 〈S, I,O,→〉 where S
is a countable set of states; I and O are countable and pairwise disjoint sets of actions, referred to
as input and output actions respectively; and → ⊆ S × (I ∪ O) × Disc(S) represents the possible
transitions where Disc(S) is the set of discrete probability measures over S.
We use A for I ∪O. We partition the input set I into D, the set of data points, and Q, the set
of queries. We also partition the output set O into R, the set of responses to the data examiner’s
queries and H, the set of outputs that are hidden from (not observable to) the data examiner.
Note that H includes outputs to the data provider. We let E range over all actions to which the
examiner has direct access: E = Q ∪ R. When only one automaton is under consideration, we
denote a transition 〈s, a, µ〉 ∈ → by s a→µ.
Henceforth, we require that pltss satisfy the following conditions:
• Transition determinism: For every state s ∈ S and action a ∈ A, there is at most one
µ ∈ Disc(S) such that s a→µ.
• Output determinism: For every state s ∈ S, output o ∈ O, action a ∈ A, and µ ∈ Disc(S), if
s
o→µ and s a→µ′, then a = o and µ′ = µ.
• Quasi-input enabling: For every state s ∈ S, inputs i1 and i2 in I, and µ1 ∈ Disc(S), if s i1→µ1,
then there exists µ2 such that s
i2→µ2.
Output determinism and quasi-input enabling means that the state space may be partitioned into
two parts: states that accept all of the inputs and states that produce exactly one output. We
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require that each output producing state produces only one output since the choice of output
should be made by the plts to avoid nondeterminism that might be resolved in a way that leaks
information about the data set. Owing to transition determinism, we will often write s
a→µ without
explicitly quantifying µ.
We define an extended transition relation⇒ that describes how a plts may perform a sequence
of actions where some of the output actions are hidden from the data examiner. In particular,
the hidden outputs in H model unobservable internal actions irrelevant to privacy. To define ⇒,
let a state that produces an output from H be called H-enabled and one that does not be called
H-disabled. By output determinism, H-enabled states may only transition under an action in H
and, thus, cannot have transitions on actions from R ∪Q ∪D. To skip over such states and focus
on H-disabled states, which are more interesting from a verification point of view, we define ⇒ to
show to which H-disabled states the system may transition while performing any finite number of
hidden actions. We define s
a⇒ ν so that ν(s′) is the probability of reaching the H-disabled state
s′ from the state s where a is the action performed from state s. Note that ν is not a distribution
over the set S of states since the automaton might execute an infinite sequence of H-enabled states
never reaching an H-disabled state. We let ν be a distribution over S⊥ = S ∪ {⊥} where ⊥ /∈ S
represents nontermination and ν(⊥) = 1 −∑s∈S ν(s). Note that for no a, µ, or ν does ⊥ a→µ or
⊥ a⇒ ν.
A plts L combined with a state s defines a probabilistic I/O automaton 〈L, s〉. This state is
thought of as the initial state of the automaton or the current state of the plts. We define a trace
to be a sequence of actions from A∗ ∪ Aω. Given such an automaton M , we define JMK to be a
function from input sequences to the random variable over traces that describes how the automaton
M behaves under the inputs ~i. We let ⌊JMK(~i)⌋E denote the random variable over sequences of
actions observable to the data examiner obtained by projecting only the actions in E from the trace
returned by random variable JMK(~i).
To deal with nontermination, we note that the examiner can only observe finite prefixes of
any nonterminating trace. When the examiner sees the finite prefixes of a trace, he must consider
all traces of the system with the observed prefix as possible. (The set of these traces has been
called a cone — see e.g. [LSV07].) Since the examiner may only see actions in E, these sets are
in one-to-one correspondence with E∗. Thus, the examiner observing some event is not modeled
as the probability of the system producing a trace in some set, but rather with the probability of
a system producing a prefix of trace in some set. That is, rather than using Pr[⌊JMK(~i)⌋E ∈ S]
for S ⊆ E∗ ∪ Eω, we need Pr[⌊JMK(~i)⌋E ⊒ S] for S ⊆ E∗ where ⊒ is the super-sequence-equal
operator raised to work over sets in the following manner: ~e ⊒ S iff there exists ~e′ ∈ S such that
~e ⊒ ~e′ where ~e ∈ E∗ ∪ Eω and S ⊆ E∗.
In Appendix B, we formalize these concepts and show how to calculate these probabilities from
the transitions of the automaton.
3.2 Differential Noninterference
Often the data set of a differentially private system is loaded over time and may change between
queries. Such changes in the data set are not explicitly modeled by the definition of differential
privacy, but one could conceive of modeling such changes by having data points be time-indexed
sequences of data. Nevertheless, for formal verification, we require an explicit model of data set
mutation. Thus, we present a version of differential privacy defined in terms of the behavior of an
automaton that accepts both queries and data points over time.
8
Definition 3 (Differential Noninterference). An automaton M has ǫ-differential noninterference
if for all input sequences ~i1 and ~i2 in I
∗ differing on at most one data point, and for all S ⊆ E∗,
Pr[⌊JMK(~i1)⌋E ⊒ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) ∗ Pr[⌊JMK(~i2)⌋E ⊒ S]
where we say two input sequences differ by one data point if one of the sequences may be constructed
from the other by inserting a single data point anywhere in it.
By restricting the traces ofM to only those elements of E = Q∪R, we limit traces to only those
actions accessible to the untrusted data examiner. The definition requires that any subset of such
traces be almost equally probable under the input sequences ~i1 and ~i2, which differ by at most one
data point. Note that like the original form of differential privacy, we do not model the adversary
explicitly but rather consider the behavior of the automaton over all possible input sequences the
adversary could supply.
In Appendix C, we give full definitions for sequence differencing and prove results showing
that our adaptation of differential privacy preserves pleasing properties of the original. One such
property is a composition result (Proposition 13): the privacy leakage bound for a system whose
inputs differ on at most n data points is n ∗ ǫ where ǫ is the leakage bound for the system if its
inputs differ on one data point.
3.3 Example: Automaton Model for Program of Figure 1
To eventually prove that the program of Figure 1 has (2t ∗ ǫ)-differential noninterference, we first
give an automaton model of the program, called Mex1(K). Note that the model we give here is
parametric in the set of sanitization functions; it applies not only to the program of Figure 1, which
assumes K = {count, sum} but to any other instance of the same program that uses a possibly
different set of sanitization functions (modeled by the parameter K). We define below the state
space S and transition relation →, which determine Lex1(K) = 〈S, I,O,→〉 for every set K of
sanitization functions. Using an initial state s0, we get the automaton Mex1(K) = 〈Lex1(K), s0〉.
States. Each state of the automaton can be viewed as a particular valuation of the variables in the
program allowed by its type. We model the array dPts as a t-tuple of multisets of data points. We
model numPts as a t-tuple of integers ranging from 0 to v where v is the value held by the constant
maxPts. We model the index curSlot as an integer c ranging from 0 to t−1, which selects one of the
multisets of the t-tuple. The variable y stores the most recent input. The variable res keeps track of
which output from O is about to be produced and the sanitization function is stored in k. The state
must also keep track of a program counter pc, which ranges over the program line numbers from 01
to 20. Thus, the set of states S is {01, . . . , 20}× (bag(D))t×{0, . . . , v}t×{0, . . . , t−1}× I ×O×K
where bag(D) is the set of all multisets with elements from D and K is the set of sanitization
functions.
Actions. We model the input command in the source code with the input action set I of our
automaton: for each possible value that input can return there is an input action in I corresponding
to that value. Inputs in the code can be either queries or data points, which is modeled by the
partition of the set I into the sets Q for queries and D for data points. We model the print
command in the source code with the observable outputs R (responses) of our automaton. For
each possible value that can be printed we have an output action in R. We model all other
commands by internal (hidden) actions.
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Transitions. We list below only those transitions that are interesting for our purposes. That
is, transitions on actions from the sets I and R, and transitions on hidden actions that represent
internal computation such as choosing of an appropriate sanitization function for a given query
and computation of the result using that function. We use the symbol τ for hidden actions. We
also use Dirac distributions: let Dirac(s) be the distribution such that Pr[Dirac(s)=s] = 1 and
Pr[Dirac(s)=s′] = 0 for all s′ 6= s. Given a query q in Q, we let κq be the sanitization function that
answers that query. Some key transitions are:
Input 〈08, ~B, ~n, c, y, r, k〉 i→Dirac(〈09, ~B, ~n, c, i, r, k〉)
Choose Function 〈14, ~B, ~n, c, y, r, k〉 τ→Dirac(〈15, ~B, ~n, c, y, r, κy〉)
Compute Function 〈15, 〈B0, . . . , Bt−1〉, ~n〉, c, y, r, k〉 τ→µ where
µ(〈16, 〈B0, . . . , Bt−1〉, ~n, c, y, r′, k〉) = Pr[k(
t−1⊎
ℓ=0
Bℓ) = r
′]
using ⊎ for multiset union and µ(s′) = 0 for states not of that form, and
Output Result 〈16, ~B, ~n, c, y, r, k〉 r→Dirac(〈17, ~B, ~n, c, y, r, k〉)
The third transition above is a probabilistic transition that represents the internal computation
of a sanitization function k on the union of the multisets B0, . . . , Bt−1. The effect of the transition
is to update the value of the pc from 15 to 16 and to update the result to be output from r to a new
value r′ such that the probability of ending up in state 〈16, 〈B1, . . . , Bt〉, c, n, y, r′, k〉 as a result of
the transition is Pr[k(
⊎t
ℓ=1Bℓ) = r
′].
From these transitions, we can calculate the extended transitions for each of the three types of
H-disabled states:
Drop 〈08, ~B, ~n, c, y, r, k〉 d⇒Dirac(〈08, ~B, ~n, c, d, r, k〉) when nc of ~n is v;
Add 〈08, ~B, ~n, c, y, r, k〉 d⇒Dirac(〈08, ~B′, ~n′, c, d, r, k〉) when nc of ~n is less than v and ~B′ and ~n′
are such that B′c = Bc ⊎ {d}, n′c = nc + 1, and for all c′ 6= c, B′c′ = Bc′ and n′c′ = nc′ ;
Answer Query 〈08, 〈B0, . . . , Bt−1〉, ~n, c, y, r, k〉 q⇒ ν where
ν(〈16, 〈B0, . . . , Bt−1〉, ~n, c, q, r′, κq〉) = Pr[k(
t−1⊎
ℓ=0
Bℓ) = r
′]
and ν(s′) = 0 for states not of that form; and
Delete Old Data 〈16, ~B, ~n, c, y, r, k〉 r⇒Dirac(〈08, ~B′, ~n, c, y, r, k〉)
where we have B′c+1 mod t = { } , n′c+1 mod t = 0, and for all c′′ 6= c + 1 mod t, B′c′′ = Bc′′
and n′c′′ = nc′′ using { } for the empty multiset.
The third extended transition above represents a sequence of transitions that starts with the
input of a query q. The input of the query is followed by transitions on hidden actions that model
the computation of the answer to the query where some of these hidden steps are probabilistic.
The resulting state has the property that κq has been chosen as the sanitization function and that
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pc = 16, which implies that the resulting state is H-disabled and the automaton is ready to perform
an observable output by outputing the answer to the query.
The state space S and transition relation → determines the plts Lex1(K) = 〈S, I,O,→〉 for
every set K of differentially private functions. Using the initial state s0 = 〈1, { } t, 0t, 1, y0, r0, k0〉,
we get the automaton Mex1(K) = 〈Lex1(K), s0〉. (The initial values y0, r0, k0 do not matter since
they will be replaced before being used.)
Verification of Differential Privacy and Bounded Memory. The remainder of this paper
develops the proof techniques needed to formally verify that models such as the one shown above
has differential noninterference. In particular, in the next section, we describe a composition result
that allows to separately consider whether the sanitization functions in K have differential privacy
and whether Mex1 properly uses them. In Section 5, we present a proof technique using unwinding
families for showing that for all sets K of sanitization functions with ǫ-differential privacy, the
automaton Mex1(K) has (2t ∗ ǫ)-differential noninterference. Lastly, Section 6, provides a proof-
checking algorithm that ensures our unwinding technique is properly used. These methods together
allow for a compositional and mechanically checked formal proof of differential noninterference.
Given that the system modeled above uses ǫ-differentially private functions t times, one might be
surprised that we prove that it has (2t∗ ǫ)-differential noninterference rather than (t∗ ǫ)-differential
noninterference. This extra leakage comes from dealing with the bounded memory of actual com-
puters. In particular, each array in dPts is limited to a length of maxPts. The program keeps
track of the current number of data points stored in each slot with the array numPts. If the current
slot has reached maxPts data points, the program drops any incoming data points until curSlot
advances.
This dropping of data points introduces extra privacy leakage. A single data point can have
two effects: it is both included in calculations and can cause the system to drop future data points
and exclude from calculations. Thus, the system has only (2t ∗ ǫ)-differential noninterference. In
many scenarios, the possibility of running out of memory for storing data points is unrealistic. If
the number of data points can never reach the memory bound, then under this assumption, one
can show that system has (t ∗ ǫ)-differential noninterference.
It may be tempting to use a linked list for each slot and keep track of how many total data
points are stored in all the slots combined. Then, the program could drop data points only when all
the memory is exhausted instead of just the current slot’s allocation. However, this change would
allow a single data point stored in one slot to affect which data points are dropped from other
slots in the future. Thus, a single data point may have an unbounded effect on future computation
preventing such a program from satisfying differential noninterference for any privacy bound.
4 Decomposing Verification
Recall the example system presented in Section 2.2. The source code in Figure 1 is written para-
metrically in the set of sanitization functions (Lines 14 and 15). The model Mex1(K) of the system
given in Section 3.3 is parametrized over the set of sanitization functions K where the computa-
tion of a sanitization function from K is idealized as a single transition in the transition system of
Mex1(K). We will call such models in which computation of functions are abstracted as a single step
idealized models. In reality, any function in the set K would be implemented by a subroutine that
can be modeled by an automaton and an implementation model could be obtained from an ideal-
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ized model by replacing each idealized transition for a sanitization function with its corresponding
subroutine automaton.
In this section, we first provide an algorithm for checking that such subroutine automata mod-
eling sanitization functions have differential privacy. Second, we show how to use the proof that a
subroutine has differential privacy to simplify the task of proving that an interactive system using
that function has differential noninterference. That is, we show how we support compositional
reasoning by separating the verification of a sanitization function from the verification of a system
that uses the function.
4.1 Mechanized Verification of Differential Privacy
Previous work has provided a method of formally verifying that a sanitization function has dif-
ferential privacy [RP10]. Their method operates over a special language to enable type-checking.
Below we provide an alternative using automata to model the function.
In particular, we model a subroutine implementing a sanitization function k operating on the
database B using an I/O automaton Mk,B. As k performs no I/O, the model Mk,B has an empty
set of inputs and only one output h, a hidden action. The initial state of Mk,B represents the start
of the computation k operating on the argument B. For each output r in the range of k, Mk,B has
a terminal state ξ(r) with no outgoing transitions corresponding to returning the value r. Since k
is a function, s0
h⇒ ν must be a distribution over these terminal states with ν(⊥) = 0 and ν(s) = 0
for all states not corresponding to an output.
A function k has ǫ-differential privacy only if Mk,B1 and Mk,B2 induces sufficiently close distri-
butions over related terminal states for all data bases B1 and B2 differing by at most one data point.
In particular, for all r in the range of k, ν1(ξ1(r)) ≤ exp(ǫ) ∗ ν2(ξ2(r)) where νi is the distribution
over terminal states induced by the automaton Mk,Bi and ξi is the mapping from the range of k to
terminal states for Mk,Bi .
Thus, mechanically checking if a function k has differential privacy reduces to constructing the
appropriate models Mk,Bi , computing the distributions νi for each of them, and comparing them
as needed. As we are only concerned with systems that can actually be implemented, only a finite
number of models and comparisons are needed. The construction of the models may be done using
known techniques from model checking (see, e.g., [CGP00]). The most complex step is computing
the distributions νi.
Fortunately, each of these automaton models Mk,Bi may be converted to an absorbing Markov
chain, a model of random behavior leading to one of a fixed set of absorbing states each representing
a different outcome. Under this conversion, the probability of the Markov chain leading to a
particular absorbing state corresponds to the distribution νi over terminal states of Mk,Bi . This
conversion starts with finding the set S′ of all H-disabled states reachable from s0 by using hidden
actions. For this task, we may view the transition system as a directed graph G where the nodes
are states. If s
h→µ and µ(s′) > 0 for some hidden action h, then we add an edge from s to s′
labeled with µ(s′) to G. (Recall that s will never transition under more than one such hidden
action due to the transition-determinism axiom.) A depth-first search may then find those states
reachable from s in G. Second, we remove all states from G that are not reachable from s. Third,
we convert all states in G that are reachable from s that do not reach any H-disabled states to a
single state s⊥, which we treat as an H-disabled state. We can do this with a reachability analysis
for each state to every H-disabled state. Forth, we add a self-loop labeled with probability 1 from
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every H-disabled state (including s⊥) to itself. The resulting graph corresponds to an absorbing
Markov chain where the H-disabled states (including s⊥) are the absorbing states.
To compute the absorbing probabilities of the H-disabled states, we use the standard method
as presented in [GS97]. First, we represent the chain using a transition matrix P in canonical form.
That is, we renumber the states so that the non-absorbing, or transient, states come first in P.
In our case, these are the H-enabled states. Let t be the number of transient states and r be the
number of absorbing states. We may view P as having the following form:
P =
[
Q R
0 I
]
where Q is a t-by-t matrix, R is a non-zero t-by-r matrix, I is a r-by-r identity matrix, and 0 is
a r-by-t zero matrix. Here, Q, R, and I capture, the probabilities for, respectively, moving from
a transient state to a transient state, moving from a transient state to an absorbing state, and
moving from an absorbing state to an absorbing state. Second, from P, we compute fundamental
matrix N = (I − Q)−1. Third, we compute A = NR. The entry aij of A is the probability of
the chain ending in (being absorbed by) the state numbered j when started in the state i. Thus,
we may set ν(s′) = aij where i is the number of the initial state and j is the number of the state
s′. We refer the reader to [GS97] for the correctness of this algorithm for computing the absorbing
probabilities.
Algorithm closure(M,s, a). The above algorithm may be generalized to compute ν for a state
s and an action a where s
a⇒ ν. The generalization replaces initial state with s and constructs
the terminal absorbing states from the H-disabled states reachable from s. Let closure(M,s, a)
denote the generalized algorithm used this way to compute ν such that s
a⇒ ν.
As for the runtime of closure, note that the first step of constructing of the graph G runs in
O(|S|) where S is the state space of Mk,Bi . Converting G to use s⊥ takes O(|S|2). Every other
step of the conversion process runs in O(|S|). The matrix operations used to compute the matrix
A can all be done in O(|S|3) as t ≤ |S| and r ≤ |S|. Thus, it runs in O(|S|3) time. Using closure
for computing each νi, we may check if k has differential privacy in O(m+ |B| ∗ |D| ∗ |S|3) where
m is the time required to compute all the models and B is the set of all databases Bi.
4.2 Implementation and Composition
The ability to verify that a subroutine provides differential privacy aids the verification that a system
using that subroutine has differential noninterference. In particular, this section shows that the
verification of differential noninterference may assume that the subroutine provides a differentially
private distribution over return values in a single idealized transition, without modeling the internal
transitions of the subroutine. Doing the verification based on such an idealized model is more
manageable than doing it based on a model that includes the details about the implementation of
the subroutine.
Implementing a Transition with an Automaton. We now define what it means in our model
for a single step transition on a hidden action to be implemented by an automaton with a series
of hidden transitions. We base our notion of implementation on hidden transitions since it is
sufficiently general for our purposes — we do not concern ourselves with the general question of
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preserving all kinds of observable behavior through implementation but rather the more restricted
question of preserving the resulting distribution over computed values.
A single internal transition of an automaton M1 may result in a distribution over next states
that corresponds to the distribution over terminal states induced by many internal transitions in
another automaton M2. To formalize this, let s
† be a state of the automaton M1 such that s
† h
†→1 µ†
for some hidden action h† of M1. Let ι be an injection from Supp(µ
†) to the state space of some
other automaton M2 such that every state in the image of ι is disabled for every action (i.e., they
are terminal states). We say that the automaton M2 implements the transition of s
† under ι if
for all s ∈ Supp(µ†), µ†(s) = ∑~h∈H+
2
M2([ ])(~h, ι(s)) where H2 is the hidden action set of M2 and
H+2 is the set of non-empty finite sequences using elements from H2. That is, M2 implements the
transition of s† under ι if the distribution over the terminal states that M2 reaches is isomorphic
to µ† under ι.
Subroutine Composition. Subroutine composition can be viewed as replacing a single step
transition in an idealized model with its automaton implementation where such repeated replace-
ments can be used to derive an implementation model from the idealized model.
Let M1[s
†,M2, ι] denote the automaton that results from replacing an internal transition from
the state s† of M1 with the subroutine M2 with the injection ι providing how to return from the
subroutine. Formally, given M1 = 〈〈S1, Q1 ⊎ D1, R1 ⊎ H1,→1〉, s01〉, M2 = 〈〈S2, ∅,H2,→2〉, s02〉,
s† ∈ S1 such that s† h
†→1 µ† for some hidden action h† ∈ H1 and µ† where s† is the unique state that
enables h†, s† /∈ Supp(µ†), and ι : Supp(µ†)→ S2 such that every state in its image is disabled for
all actions, let M1[s
†,M2, ι] denote the automaton M3 = 〈〈S1⊎S2, I1, R1⊎H1⊎H2⊎{h‡},→3〉, s01〉
where ⊎ is disjoint union and →3 is defined as follows:
• s1 a→3 µ if s1 ∈ S1, s1 6= s†, and s1 a→1 µ;
• s2 a→3 µ if s2 ∈ S2 and s2 a→2 µ;
• s† h‡→3Dirac(s02); and
• ι(s1) h
‡→3 Dirac(s1) for all s1 ∈ Supp(µ†).
The special hidden action h‡ in the definition of M3 above is used to mark the entry and exits
points of the subroutine represented by M2. This extra action is used to correctly “hook up” M2
with M1 to obtain M3.
The lemma below states that if some internal transition of an automatonM1 (for example, a step
corresponding to calling a sanitization function in a differentially noninterference system) is replaced
by an automaton M2 (for example, multiple steps corresponding to a subroutine implementing the
sanitization function), then the observable behavior of the resulting automaton is identical to that
of M1.
Theorem 1 (Subroutine Composition). For all automata M1 and M2, states s
†, and injections ι
such that M2 implements the transition of s
† under ι, for all ~i in I∗, and ~e in E∗,
Pr[ ⌊M1(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e ] = Pr[ ⌊M1[s†,M2, ι](~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e ]
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In Appendix D, we prove this by way of two lemmas.
A corollary is that if an idealized model has differential noninterference then a implementation
model formed by replacing its internal transitions with subroutine automata also has differential
noninterference.
4.3 Example: Decomposing Verification
Suppose that Mex2 is the automaton obtained from Mex1({count, sum}) by replacing the transi-
tions that represent the computations of the functions count and sum with subroutine automata
Mcount,Bi and Msum,Bi . That is, Mex2 is the code shown in Figure 1 with the implementations of
count and sum in-lined. We may apply the composition theorem repeatedly for each replacement
of a single transition in Mex1({count, sum}) with a subroutine automaton in Mex2. Such repeated
compositions reduces the problem of verifying differential noninterference for Mex2 to two smaller
problems: First, we must show that the automata Mcount,Bi and Msum,Bi implement with a se-
ries of internal transitions the transitions corresponding to the functions count and sum found
in Mex1({count, sum}) as described in our formal definition of implementation. Second, we must
show that the idealized model Mex1({count, sum}) has the differential noninterference.
The first problem can be solved using closure, which establishes that the automaton correctly
implement count and sum. As count and sum has differential privacy (proofs provided in Ap-
pendix A), we may conclude that these subroutine automata have differentially private distributions
over their terminal states.1 The next two sections deal with solving the second problem.
While count and sum are simple sanitization functions, the above approach generalizes to
more complex sanitization functions: As long as the function can be modeled as a series of internal
transitions that ends in states corresponding to its return values, our approach will apply. While
most of the algorithms previously published use unbounded state spaces, we believe our approach
can handle bounded versions of them.
5 Unwinding Proof Technique
We desire a technique for drawing conclusions about the global behavior (executions) of the system
from local aspects (states, actions, and transitions) of the model. Faced with a similar situation,
Goguen and Meseguer introduced unwinding relations to simplify proving that a system has non-
interference [GM84]. We present a similar technique for proving that a system has differential
noninterference. In particular we state what it means for a relation family to be an unwinding
family and prove Theorem 2, which roughly states that the existence of an unwinding family for
a given automaton implies that it satisfies differential noninterference. Our unwinding notion is
probabilistic and approximate, which is in keeping with the notion of differential privacy. The
novelty lies in the way we keep track of the privacy leakage bound, which evolves as the system
evolves where the evolution is constrained by the differential privacy definition.
5.1 Definition and Soundness
Formulating a notion of unwinding relation that is sound for showing differential noninterference
is more complicated than existing notions for showing noninterference because we must deal with
1We may also mechanically prove that these subroutine automata have differential privacy using other formal
methods such a type system [RP10].
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probabilities and we must keep track of the privacy leakage bound ǫ. To deal with probabilities
and approximation, we adapt the notion of approximate lifting from previous work on approximate
probabilistic simulation relations in the context of cryptographic protocols [ST07]. However, such
work does not deal with tracking a leakage bound (see Section 7 for additional details). Thus, we
introduce a family of unwinding relations indexed by various amounts of privacy leakage. Each
unwinding relation in the family is a relation on the state space of the automaton. The unwinding
relation indexed by the leakage amount ǫ relates states that exhibit approximately the same trace
distributions in the sense of ǫ-differential noninterference.
To deal with probabilities in a concise and modular way, we first define an approximate lifting
operation that takes a relation over sets and produces a relation over distributions on those sets.
The degree of approximation is governed by a parameter δ.
Definition 4 (δ-Approximate Lifting). Let R be a relation between a set X and a set Y . The
δ-approximate lifting of R denoted by L(R, δ) is the relation between Disc(X) and Disc(Y ) such
that for all ν1 in Disc(X) and ν2 in Disc(Y ), ν1 L(R, δ) ν2 if and only if there exists a bijection
β : Supp(ν1)→ Supp(ν2) such that for all x in Supp(ν1), x R β(x) and | ln ν1(x)− ln ν2(β(x))| ≤ δ.
The requirement for β to be from the support set of ν1 to the support set of ν2 ensures that
if a state is assigned a non-zero probability in ν1 then it is not possible for a related state to be
assigned a zero probability in ν2 and vice versa—there is one to one correspondence between the
states with non-zero and identical probabilities in the two distributions. The form of δ involves
natural logarithms because the privacy leakage bound in the differential privacy definition appears
in the exponent.
Next we define our unwinding technique, which is illustrated in Figure 2. Intuitively, since we
want the behavior of the automaton to change only by a factor of ǫ on receiving a single data point,
we want the transitions under a data point from a state s to lead to states s′ that are only a factor
of ǫ different from s. Covering (Definition 6) formalizes this by requiring that state s is related to
each such state s′ by a relation Rǫ that is part of an ǫ-unwinding family (Definition 5).
In more detail, an ǫ-unwinding family starts with a privacy leakage budget of ǫ, which decreases
over time to a current balance of ǫ′. Related states s1 and s2 are required to only make transitions
under the same actions. The distributions ν1 and ν2 that result from these transitions followed by
any number of transitions under hidden outputs may differ only by a factor of δ. This difference
is subtracted from the current balance ǫ′ to get a new current balance. Once the balance reaches
zero, the resulting distributions must be equivalent. As the balance started at ǫ, only a total of ǫ
privacy can be leaked, a point proved in Lemma 1.
Definition 5 (ǫ-Unwinding Family). For a non-negative real number ǫ, a family indexed by the set
[0, ǫ] of relations R· over the H-disabled states of a plts L is an ǫ-unwinding family for L if for
all ǫ′ in [0, ǫ], for all x1 and x2 in S⊥ such that x1 Rǫ′ x2, for all a in I ∪ R, there exists ν1 such
that x1
a⇒ ν1 iff there exists ν2 such that x2 a⇒ ν2, and when they do exist, there exists a real number
δ in [0, ǫ′] such that ν1 L(Rǫ′−δ, δ) ν2.
Lemma 1. For all ǫ-unwinding families R·, all ǫ′ in [0, ǫ], all x1 and x2 in S⊥ such that x1 Rǫ′ x2,
all ~i in I∗, and all ~e in E∗, both
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x1〉K(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e ] ≤ exp(ǫ′) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x2〉K(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e ] and
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x2〉K(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e ] ≤ exp(ǫ′) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x1〉K(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e ].
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Figure 2: Unwinding Family and Covering: The left side shows the requirements for a covering.
The right side shows the requirements placed on an unwinding family. The solid arrows denote
the extended transition relation ⇒ and clouds depict probability distributions such as ν where
s′ ∈ Supp(ν).
The above lemma shows that two states related by an ǫ-unwinding family, given the same input
sequence, produce distributions that only deviate by a factor ǫ. Thus, to maintain ǫ-differential
noninterference, we desire that a state s should upon receiving a single data point d transition to
a state s′ that can be put into an ǫ-unwinding family with s. We formalize this intuition with the
next definition and confirm it with the following theorem.
Definition 6 (Covers). We say that an ǫ-unwinding family R· for a plts L covers a state s and
data point d of L if s
d⇒ ν implies that ν(⊥) = 0 and for all s′ ∈ Supp(ν), s Rǫ s′.
Theorem 2. For an automaton M = 〈L, s0〉, if for all H-disabled states s reachable from s0 and
all data points d, there exists a ǫ-unwinding family that covers s and d, then JMK has ǫ-differential
noninterference.
Appendix E holds the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2. We prove Lemma 1 by induction
over the structure of ~a. The interesting cases arise when ~a is of the form i:~a′ for i ∈ I or o:~a′
for o ∈ O, which require similar reasoning. Suppose that ~a = i:~a′ and s1 i⇒ ν1 for some i ∈ I.
By the unwinding relation, we know that there exists a transition s2
i⇒ ν2 such that ν1 and ν2 are
in keeping with the privacy leakage bound imposed by the unwinding relation. Then for states
s′1 ∈ Supp(ν1), and s′2 ∈ Supp(ν2), we apply the inductive hypothesis for ~a′ to obtain the result.
To prove Theorem 2, we use Proposition 12 and show for all ~i1, ~i2, and ~e where ∆(~i1,~i2) = 1
that Pr[⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⌋E⊒~e] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⌋E⊒~e]. We use proof by induction over ~i1, ~i2,
and ~e. When we reach the point where ~i1 and ~i2 differ by a data point d, we apply Lemma 1
knowing that an ǫ-unwinding family exists for the current state s and d.
5.2 Example: Applying the Proof Technique
We now return to the parametric automaton model Mex1(K) of Section 3.3. We show that for any
K, every state s and data point d of Lex1(K) can be covered by a (2t ∗ ǫ)-unwinding family R·s,d in
the sense of Definition 6. Differential noninterference will follow from Theorem 2.
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For the (2t ∗ ǫ)-unwinding family R·s,d, we construct for each j in [0, t] the unwinding relation
R2j∗ǫs,d . To construct these unwinding relations, we first introduce some notation.
For a state s = 〈pc, ~B, ~n, c, y, r, k〉 and d ∈ D, add(s, c′, d) adds d to the slot c′ of the state s.
Formally,
add(s, c′, d) = 〈pc, ~B′, ~n, c, y, r, k〉
where ~B′ = ~B and ~n′ = ~n when nc = v and, otherwise, B
′
c = Bc ⊎ {d}, n′c = nc + 1, and for all
c′ 6= c, B′c′ = Bc′ and n′c′ = nc′ .
The function swap replaces one data point with another. Formally,
swap(s, c′, d, d′) = 〈pc, ~B′, ~n, c, y, r, k〉
where B′c′ = Bc′ − {d′} ⊎ {d} and B′c′′ = Bc′′ for all c′′ 6= c′.
For j such that 0 ≤ j ≤ t, let Sj1 to be the set of all states s1 such that s1 is reachable from s
using t−j queries and any number of data points. Intuitively, this means that from s1 one can pose
j more queries until the privacy budget runs out on the data point that is input into the system in
state s. We define the relations as follows:
• For j > 0, let R2j∗ǫs,d to be such that for all s1 ∈ Sj1, s1 R2j∗ǫs,d add(s1, c, d) and for all d′,
s1 R2j∗ǫs,d swap(s1, c, d, d′) where s = 〈pc, ~B, ~n, c, y, r, k〉. That is, R2j∗ǫs,d relates a state to the
states it could have become had it received d as input when the curSlot was c, the value
curSlot had in state s.
• For j = 0, R2j∗ǫs,d is as above for states with a PC of 16 and is equality for those with a PC of
08.
Lemma 2. For all sets K of functions such that each function in K has ǫ-differential privacy, for
all states s and for all data points d, R·s,d is a (2t∗ǫ)-unwinding family for the automaton Mex1(K).
Appendix F holds the proof. The proof uses a case analysis over the different types of actions
a that might be received by two related states. The most interesting case is when a is a query and
j = 1. In this case, s1 Rǫ′s,d s2 implies that s1 is in St−11 with s1 and s2 reached in t− 1 queries. For
a 2t∗ǫ privacy leakage bound, this corresponds to the last time d may be used in answering a query.
This requirement is met since for s1 and s2 to be reached with t− 1 queries, by the construction of
Mex1(K), curSlot in both states must be t− 1 slots away from the slot that holds d. Thus, after
answering the next query the slot curSlot, whose value is always mod t, will point to the slot that
holds d and that slot will be rewritten removing d.
SinceR2j∗ǫs,d covers s and d for all states s and data points d of the automatonMex1(K), Lemma 2
and Theorem 2 implies that the automaton has (2t ∗ ǫ)-differential noninterference.
Theorem 3. For all set of functions K such that each function in K has ǫ-differential privacy,
Mex1(K) has (2t ∗ ǫ)-differential noninterference.
As count and sum are ǫ-differentially private functions, this implies that Mex1({count, sum})
has (2t ∗ ǫ)-differential noninterference. Furthermore, as explained in Section 4.3, subroutine com-
position shows that Mex2, a system with count and sum implemented as subroutines instead of
atomic transitions, has (2t ∗ ǫ)-differential noninterference. Thus, we have proved that our exam-
ple has (2t ∗ ǫ)-differential noninterference. In the next section we turn to mechanically verifying
differential noninterference.
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isUnwindFam(〈S, I,O, T 〉, rel, δ, t)
convert all hidden actions of 〈〈S,D,Q,R, T 〉, s0〉 to be the same one
if(|rel| 6= t+ 1),
return false
for all i in [0, t],
for all 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ rel[i],
for all a ∈ I ∪O,
if (T [x1][a] = nil xor T [x2][a] = nil),
then return false
if (T [x1][a] 6= nil and T [x2][a] 6= nil),
ν1 = closure(〈S, I,O, T 〉, x1, a)
ν2 = closure(〈S, I,O, T 〉, x2, a)
if(not isInLiftedRelation(S⊥, rel[i], 0, ν1, ν2))
if(i = 0),
return false
if(not isInLiftedRelation(S⊥, rel[i− 1], δ, ν1, ν2))
return false
return true
Figure 3: Algorithm for checking relation families.
6 Mechanizing Verification of Unwinding
We provide an algorithm that soundly checks if a given family of relations is an unwinding family
for a given automaton. While our algorithm does not generate the unwinding family, it automates
the process of showing that a candidate family satisfies all the conditions for being an unwinding
family (Definition 5). By repeatedly applying our algorithm to a collection of relation families,
we can algorithmically check that the covering condition of Theorem 2 holds and that automaton
has differential noninterference. The process of verifying an unwinding relation family manually
is typically tedious and sometimes error-prone. The existence of a mechanized verifier hence adds
practical value to the proof technique presented in the previous section and justifies its use in favor
of ad hoc proof methods.
6.1 Algorithm
Our algorithm isUnwindFam takes as input a labeled transition system of finite size, an array of
relations over the system’s states, a value δ, and a natural number t. The array rel may only
represent relation families R· over the interval [0, t ∗ δ] of a restricted form. R· must be such that
Rjδ = Rkδ for all j and k such that ⌊j⌋ = ⌊k⌋. That is, it must be possible to break the index set
of R· into t intervals of size δ such that the relations in that interval are the same and one point
corresponding to Rt∗δ .
The algorithm is shown in Figure 3. It represents the transition relation → as an array T with
|S⊥| rows and |A| columns where T [⊥][a] = nil for all a. The array either stores a distribution
over next states or nil to indicate that the state cannot transition under that action.
The first step of the algorithm converts all the hidden actions to be the same one since closure
presumes just one hidden action. The function closure, defined in Section 4.1, computes the
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isAllCovered(〈〈S, I,O, T 〉, s0〉, Rels, δ, t)
reachableStates := computeReachableStates(〈S,D,Q,R, T 〉,s0)
for all s in reachableStates,
for all d ∈ D,
if(T [s][d] 6= nil),
ν = closure(〈S, I,O, T 〉, s, d)
if(ν(⊥) 6= 0 or |Rels[s][d]| 6= t+ 1),
return false
for all s′ ∈ S,
if(ν(s′) > 0 and 〈s, s′〉 /∈ Rels[s][d]),
return false
if(not isUnwindFam(〈S, I,O, T 〉, Rels[s][d], δ)
return false
return true
Figure 4: Algorithm for checking for differential privacy.
distribution over states that results from the system exhibiting the observable behavior a from a
state xi and computing until reaching an H-disabled state.
The distributions resulting from closure are compared with the provided family rel using the
function isInLiftedRelation to determine whether they obey the requirements of a unwinding
family. isInLiftedRelation(R, δ, ν1, ν2) checks if the two distributions ν1 and ν2 are related by
the δ-approximate lifting of R. This function operates in O(|S|2.5) time by reducing the problem
to the decision problem of if a perfect matching exists for a bipartite graph, which can be solved in
O(|S|2.5) using the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm [HK73]. The reduction constructs a bipartite graph
such that each vertex in the left part of the graph corresponds to a state in the support of ν1, and
each in the right part to a state in the support of ν2. Edges connect those states x1 in the left
part to those x2 in the right part such that x1 R x2 and | ln ν1(x1) − ln ν2(x2)| ≤ δ. A matching
of graph that includes every vertex (i.e., a perfect matching) exists iff there is a bijection showing
that ν1 L(R, δ) ν2. Appendix G formally presents the algorithm and proves this result.
The following lemmas state, respectively, the soundness and the runtime complexity of the
algorithm. Appendix H contains the proofs for this section.
Lemma 3 (Soundness). If the algorithm isUnwindFam(L, rel, δ, t) returns true, then rel corre-
sponds to relation family that is (t ∗ δ)-unwinding family for L.
Lemma 4 (Runtime Complexity). The algorithm isUnwindFam runs in O(t ∗ |A| ∗ |S|4) time.
We use isUnwindFam to construct an algorithm isAllCovered that checks a collection of relation
families to conclude if they prove that an automaton has differential privacy (using Theorem 2).
In particular, the algorithm takes as input an automaton, an array Rels of relation families, δ, and
the natural number t. For all states s that are reachable from the start state of the automaton
and data points d, the algorithm uses isUnwindFam to check whether Rels[s][d] corresponds to a
(t ∗ δ)-unwinding family that covers s and d. The algorithm is shown in Figure 4.
The following theorems state the soundness and the runtime complexity of the procedure for
checking whether all reachable states are covered by a given collection of relation families.
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Theorem 4 (Soundness). If isAllCovered(M, Rels, δ, t) returns true, thenM has (t∗δ)-differential
noninterference.
Theorem 5 (Runtime Complexity). The algorithm isAllCovered runs in O(t ∗ |D| ∗ |A| ∗ |S|5)
time.
While sound, the algorithm is not complete even for this restricted class of unwinding relations
it accepts as input. The algorithm (soundly) rejects any family if it has a relation that relates
two states that transition to distributions over next states that differ by more than δ. That is, it
requires that the automaton never leaks more than a δ worth of private information in a single
step. Furthermore, it pessimistically presumes that every leakage of private information is a whole
δs worth.
Nevertheless, we believe the algorithm is still of interest. In the next section, we show that
it is powerful enough to prove that our example system, which is similar to pinq, has differential
noninterference. While this system only has two very simple sanitization functions, count and sum,
our algorithm will work for more complex sanitization functions provided they can be computed
with a finite number of states.
6.2 Example: Using the Algorithm
To use our algorithm, we must first model the above program as an automaton Mex2 with the
subroutines count and sum in-lined as explained in Section 4.3. Then, we must construct Rels,
which stores all the needed (2t ∗ ǫ)-unwinding families in the correct format. Such families exist
since whenever Mex2 leaks privacy, it leaks no more than 2 ∗ ǫ in a single step, and, thus, we can
use 2 ∗ ǫ for δ. These families are instances of the parametric families shown in Section 5.2. The
reader can confirm that these families may be expressed in the needed format for Rels.
Indeed, as the body of the sanitization functions consists entirely of H-enabled states, only the
distributions over return values matter to our algorithm in that they influence the computation
of closure and nothing more. Thus, the general families further shows that our algorithm can
verify any modification of Mex2 that substitutes a different set of ǫ-differentially private functions
for {count, sum} provided that those functions can be implemented using a bounded number of
states as we would expect from the discussion of composition in Section 4.3.
7 Related Work
Formal Verification of Differential Privacy. The most closely related work to ours is a
programming language with a linear type system for proving that well-typed programs in the
language have differential privacy [RP10]. Later work applies their type system to detecting network
attacks in a private manner [RAW+10]. The usual trade-offs between a program analysis technique
designed to work over standard programming languages and a custom type system for a specialized
language apply: the type system makes explicit in the source code why the program has differential
privacy and type checking scales well, but the programmer must use a special-purpose programming
language and annotate the code as the type system requires. Additionally, their programming
language lacks I/O commands for creating interactive systems whereas our proof technique is for
automata modeling interactive systems.
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Other Differential Privacy Definitions. The definition of differential privacy may be seen as
largely a simplification of the previously defined notion of ǫ-indistinguishability [DMNS06], which
explicitly models interaction between a private system and the data examiner as in our definition
of differential noninterference. Our definition, however, is cast in the framework of probabilistic
automata rather than Turing machines. This supports having structured models that are capable
of highlighting issues arising from the bounded memory of actual computers. Furthermore, we deal
with non-termination using prefixes allowing us to leverage previous work on formal methods for
automata (e.g., [LSV07]).
Differential privacy is a very active research field giving rise to new definitions and techniques
at a fast pace [Dwo10, DNPR10]. For example, pan-privacy is a notion of differential privacy that
gives differential privacy against adversaries that can observe the internal state of a system, in ad-
dition to outputs [MPRV09]. Computational differential privacy gives certain differential privacy
guarantees against computationally bounded adversaries. Our definition of differential noninter-
ference and the formal proof technique was developed from the definition of Dwork [Dwo06]. We
think that our choice of probabilistic automata as a model would prove useful in extending the work
of this paper to these new definitions as well. For example, algorithms such as stream-processing
algorithms that have been subject to research from pan-privacy point of view can be naturally mod-
eled using probabilistic automata. Similarly, probabilistic automata-based models have successfully
been used in the formal analysis of cryptographic protocols against computationally bounded ad-
versaries [ST07, BPW07, CCK+08].
Information-Flow Properties. Differential noninterference has some similarities with informa-
tion flow properties such as noninterference [GM82]. The literature contains several works on the
use of transition systems, observational equivalences, and various notions of bisimulation relations
to define information flow properties. To name a few, Focardi and Gorrieri have developed a clas-
sification of noninterference-like properties in the unifying framework of a process algebra in a
non-probabilistic setting [FG01]. Sabelfeld and Sands [SS00], and Smith [Smi03] have used prob-
abilistic bisimulation in defining probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs, which
they enforce using type systems. Probabilistic noninterference is regarded by many to be too strong
in practice since it requires the probabilities of traces of the system observable by low-level users
to be identical for any pair of high-level inputs (data points in our setting) [Gra91, Gra92]. As
noninterference is often too strong of a requirement, weaker probabilistic versions have been pro-
posed that allow for some information leakage [PHW04, BP02]. Di Pierro, Hankin, and Wiklicky
introduced approximate noninterference [PHW04], and Backes and Pfitzmann introduced compu-
tational probabilistic noninterference [BP02], both of which allow for some information leakage.
However, unlike differential noninterference, they do not allow the system behavior to diverge as
the difference between the high-level inputs (data points) increases. This divergence, which is al-
lowed by our differential noninterference definition (Proposition 13 in Appendix C), is needed to
release meaningful statistics and gain utility from the data set as discussed in detail in Section 1.
Quantitative information flow analysis attempts to determine how much information a pro-
gram provides an adversary about a sensitive input or class of inputs. Clark, Hunt, and Malacaria
present a formal model of programs for quantifying information flows and a static analysis that
provides lower and upper bounds on the amount of information that flows [CHM07]. They measure
information flow as the mutual information between the high-level inputs and low-level outputs
given that the adversary has control over the low-level inputs. Malacaria extends this work to
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handle loops [Mal07], and Chen and Malacaria to multi-threaded programs [CM07]. McCamant
and Ernst [ME07], and Newsome and Song [NS08] provide dynamic analyses for quantitative in-
formation flow using the mutual information formalization. There is also recent work on efficient
computation of information leakage in the information theoretic-sense using a probabilistic automa-
ton model [APvRS10]. All of the above approaches assume that the adversary’s beliefs are aligned
with the actual distribution producing the sensitive input(s) and that adversary has no additional
background knowledge. Clarkson, Myers, and Schneider instead propose a formulation using the
beliefs of the adversary [CMS05]. However, such a formulation may be difficult to apply in practice
because the surveyor may not know the adversary’s beliefs. An advantage of differential privacy is
that no assumptions are needed about the adversary’s auxiliary information, computational power,
or beliefs.
Proof Techniques for Transition Systems. Simulation and bisimulation provide a system-
atic proof technique for showing implementation and equivalence relationships between two au-
tomata [Mil89, LV95, SL95] and are related to unwinding (see e.g., [BFPR03]). Most similar to
our unwinding technique, Segala and Turrini have studied approximate simulation relations in the
context of cryptographic protocols [ST07]. Their work differs from ours by using asymptotic ap-
proximations and only executions of polynomial length in terms of a security parameter. Their work
allows certain transitions of the protocol to not have a matching transition in the specification. This
models the capability of the adversary to compromise correctness. A protocol is deemed correct
if the leakage accumulated at the end of a polynomial length execution is exponentially small in
some security parameter. Our unwinding technique, on the other hand, requires that there always
be an approximately matching transition, uses an exact error bound, and considers executions of
any length. However, the probabilities of those transitions are only within some exponential mul-
tiplicative factor of one another. Thus, neither approach subsumes the other. Furthermore, our
relations are over states whereas theirs is over prefixes of executions.
Much work has been done on decision algorithms for probabilistic simulation and bisimula-
tion [BHK04, BEMC00, PLS00, CS02]. Particularly relevant are the works of Baier and Her-
mans [BHK04], and Cattani and Segala [CS02] on decision algorithms for weak bisimulations.
Since our unwinding relations keep track of an error bound in the form of indices in a relation
family, the methods of these papers to generate relations do not readily apply to our setting. We
limit ourselves to checking if a given relation family is an unwinding family rather than generating
one. Extending these prior works to our setting remains as future work.
Finding refinement methods that preserve information flow properties has been investigated by
several authors [Man01, J0¨1, HPS01, AvZ06]. In most of those works refinement is used in the
sense of reducing various flavors of nondeterminism in an abstract system. For example, Mantel
focuses on a range of information flow properties and unwinding conditions as local conditions that
imply these properties [Man01]. He then presents some operators that refine a given transition
system such that these conditions are preserved in the system refined by the given operators. We
have a more restricted goal in this paper, namely, to pin down the conditions under which an
abstract internal transition can be replaced by a sequence of internal transitions in a way that
will preserve differential noninterference. This is sufficient for our purposes because such transition
replacements are the sources of different abstraction levels that typically arise in the analysis of
systems we consider in this paper.
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8 Future Work
The results of this paper represent progress towards developing a basis for the formal verification of
differential privacy for systems, but leave open several interesting directions that we plan to explore
in future work. We hope to create a decision procedure for our proof technique by extending prior
work on decision procedures for probabilistic bisimulations [BHK04, BEMC00, PLS00, CS02] to
make them produce a family of relations rather than a single one. We also plan to extend the
theory to model and reason about higher level systems, such as computer systems of hospitals
and other distributed systems [RRS+10] that allow interactions of the system with data providers
and with data analysts, while protecting the privacy of the data stored and manipulated by the
system. For example, airavat allows computations over data distributed in a cloud, and combines
mandatory access control with differential privacy where differential privacy is used to facilitate
declassification governed by the privacy error bound set by a data provider. Our techniques can
currently apply to the verification of differential privacy property of the airavat system using a
whole-system model. We are interested in exploring the computational model of airavat further
to understand the interplay between the fine-grained access control mechanisms and the differential
privacy mechanisms in stating the end-to-end information-flow guarantee of airavat. Moreover, we
wish to extend compositionality aspects of our framework so that we can decompose the reasoning
about such properties, and exploit our proof technique for differential noninterference for parts of
the proof. Finally, while the current paper uses manually constructed automata models of systems,
we plan to develop techniques to extract such models from source code of software systems such as
pinq [McS09] and airavat [RRS+10].
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A The Truncated Geometric Mechanism
A.1 The Mechanism
The Truncated Geometric Mechanism of Ghosh et al. [GRS09] is an adaptation of the Laplace
mechanism made to produce outputs over only a bounded range of discrete values. The Laplace
mechanism works by computing the exact result of some statistic f and then adding noise drawn
from a Laplace distribution. The amount of noise depends upon both the privacy parameter ǫ and
the sensitivity of f . The sensitivity of f is the amount the value that f computes can change by
adding or removing a single data point from the data set. Formally, the sensitivity of f , denoted
δ(f), is maximum value that |f(B1)− f(B2)| can take on where B1 and B2 ranges over all pairs of
data sets differing by one data point. Using κLMf,ǫ to denote the Laplace mechanism applied to the
statistic f , we have that κLMf,ǫ (B) = f(B)+Lap(δ(f)/ǫ) where Lap(b) is a random variable producing
noise according to the Laplace distribution centered at zero with variance 2b2.
To make the Laplace distribution discrete, start by noting that informally the Laplace distribu-
tion is two exponential distributions back to back. That is, Pr[Lap(b)=x] = Pr[Exponential(1/b)=|x|]
where Exponential(λ) is the exponential distribution with the p.d.f. of λ exp(−λx) at x for x ≤ 0 and
0 otherwise. Since the discrete version of the exponential distribution is a geometric distribution,
one can use two geometric distributions back to back to create a “discrete” Laplace distribution.
Formally, Pr[Exponential(λ)=x] = Pr[Geo(exp(−λ))=⌊x⌋] where Pr[Geo(p)=k] = pk(1 − p) (i.e., p
is the “failure probability”). Using DL to denote this distribution, we have that Pr[DL(p)=n] =
p|n| 1−p1+p .
Next, one must bound the mechanism to produce only results between the minimal and max-
imum numbers that the computer can represent. For simplicity we assume that the minimum
is −m where m is the maximum. Thus, we need that the result of adding noise f(B) + N is
such that −m ≤ f(B) + N ≤ m where N is random variable generating noise. This implies that
−m − f(B) ≤ N ≤ m − f(B) requiring that N depends upon both m and f(B) in addition to ǫ
and δ(f).
At this point, it may be tempting to simply take the discrete Laplace distribution DL and
condition on the noise being between −m − f(B) and m − f(B). This will produce a bounded
distribution such that the probability of producing two adjacent outputs are within a multiplicative
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factor of one another. However, since the condition involves the value of f(B), the distributions
resulting from two adjacent data sets may differ. In general, they need not be within a multiplicative
factor of one another.
Fixing this problem requires adding extra weight to the probability of producing the extreme
results −m and m for f(B) +N . Intuitively, this extra weight account for the tails being cut off.
Formally, it comes from a system of equations constraining the relationship between each pair of
distributions N(m, f(B1), exp(−ǫ/δ(f))) and N(m, f(B2), exp(−ǫ/δ(f))) where B1 and B2 differ
by one data point. Formally,
Pr[N(m, t, p)=n] =


p|n| ∗ 11+p |t+ n| = m
p|n| ∗ 1−p1+p −m < t+ n < m
0 otherwise
N produces noise for κf,ǫ, a differentially private mechanism for the statistic f :
κf,ǫ(B) = f(B) +N(m, f(B), exp(−ǫ/δ(f)))
Proposition 1 (Differential Privacy). For all integers m > 0, for all functions f from data sets to
{−m, . . . ,m}, the function κf,ǫ has ǫ-differential privacy.
Proof. By a lemma similar to Proposition 12, since κf,ǫ is discrete, it gives ǫ-differential privacy iff
for all data sets B1 and B2 differing on at most one element, and for all r ∈ range(κf,ǫ),
Pr[κf,ǫ(B1) = r] ≤ exp(ǫ) ∗ Pr[κf,ǫ(B2) = r]
Note
Pr[κf,ǫ(B) = r]
= Pr[f(B) +N(m, f(B), exp(−ǫ/δ(f))) = r]
= Pr[N(m, f(B), exp(−ǫ/δ(f))) = r − f(B)]
=


exp(−ǫ/δ(f))|r−f(B)| ∗ 11+exp(−ǫ/δ(f)) |f(B) + (r − f(B))| = m
exp(−ǫ/δ(f))|r−f(B)| ∗ 1−exp(−ǫ/δ(f))1+exp(−ǫ/δ(f)) −m < f(B) + (r − f(B)) < m
0 otherwise
=


exp(−|r − f(B)|ǫ/δ(f)) ∗ 11+exp(−ǫ/δ(f)) |r| = m
exp(−|r − f(B)|ǫ/δ(f)) ∗ 1−exp(ǫ/δ(f))1+exp(−ǫ/δ(f)) −m < r < m
0 otherwise
Thus, if r > m or r < −m, Pr[κf,ǫ(B1) = r] = 0 ≤ 0 = exp(−ǫ) ∗ Pr[κf,ǫ(B2) = r]. Otherwise,
since the normalization factor, which depends on whether |r| = m or not, is the same on each side
of the inequality Pr[κf,ǫ(B1) = r] ≤ exp(ǫ) ∗ Pr[κf,ǫ(B2) = r], the inequality holds iff
e−|r − f(B1)|ǫ/δ(f) ≤ exp(ǫ) exp(−|r − f(B2)|ǫ/δ(f))
Since B1 and B2 only differ by at most one data point, we know that |f(B1)− f(B2)| ≤ δ(f).
Case: f(B2) ≤ f(B1). In this case, f(B1) − f(B2) ≤ δ(f). Let f(B1) − f(B2) = ∂ so that
exp(−|r − f(B1)|ǫ/δ(f)) = exp(−|r − (f(B2) + ∂)|ǫ/δ(f)).
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• Subcase: |r − f(B2)| ≤ |r − (f(B2) + ∂)|. In this case, exp(−|r − (f(B2) + ∂)|ǫ/δ(f)) ≤
exp(−|r − f(B2)|ǫ/δ(f)). Thus,
exp(−|r − f(B1)|ǫ/δ(f)) ≤ exp(ǫ) exp(−|r − f(B2)|ǫ/δ(f))
since ǫ ≤ 0.
• Subcase: |r − f(B2)| ≥ |r − (f(B2) + ∂)|. Let ∂′ = |r − f(B2)| − |r − (f(B2) + ∂)|. Since
∂′ ≤ ∂,
exp(−|r − f(B1)|ǫ/δ(f)) = exp(−(|r − (f(B2)| − ∂′)ǫ/δ(f))
= exp((∂′ − |r − f(B2)|)ǫ/δ(f))
≤ exp((∂ − |r − f(B2)|)ǫ/δ(f))
≤ exp((δ(f) − |r − f(B2)|)ǫ/δ(f))
= exp((δ(f)ǫ/δ(f)) − (|r − f(B2)|ǫ/δ(f)))
= exp(ǫ− (|r − f(B2)|ǫ/δ(f)))
= exp(ǫ) exp(−|r − f(B2)|ǫ/δ(f))
Case: f(B1) ≤ f(B2). In this case, −(f(B1) − f(B2)) = f(B2) − f(B1) ≤ δ(f) Let f(B2) −
f(B1) = ∂ so that
exp(−|r − f(B2)|ǫ/δ(f)) = exp(−|r − (f(B1) + ∂)|ǫ/δ(f))
• Subcase: |r − f(B1)| ≤ |r − (f(B1) + ∂)|. Let ∂′ = |r − (f(B1) + ∂)| − |r − f(B1)|. Since
∂′ ≤ ∂,
exp(−|r − f(B1)|ǫ/δ(f)) = exp((−|r − f(B1)|ǫ− δ(f)ǫ+ δ(f)ǫ)/δ(f))
= exp(((−|r − f(B1)| − δ(f))ǫ+ ǫδ(f))/δ(f))
= exp((−|r − f(B1)| − δ(f))ǫ/δ(f) + ǫδ(f)/δ(f))
= exp((−|r − f(B1)| − δ(f))ǫ/δ(f) + ǫ)
≤ exp(ǫ) exp((−|r − f(B1)| − δ(f))ǫ/δ(f))
≤ exp(ǫ) exp((−|r − f(B1)| − ∂′)ǫ/δ(f))
= exp(ǫ) exp(−(|r − f(B1)|+ ∂′)ǫ/δ(f))
= exp(ǫ) exp(−|r − (f(B1) + ∂)|ǫ/δ(f))
= exp(ǫ) exp(−|r − f(B2)|ǫ/δ(f))
• Subcase: |r−f(B1)| ≥ |r−(f(B1)+∂)|. In this case, we have that exp(−|r − (f(B1))|ǫ/δ(f)) ≤
exp(−|r − f(B1) + ∂|ǫ/δ(f)). Thus,
exp(−|r − f(B1)|ǫ/δ(f)) ≤ exp(ǫ) exp(−|r − f(B2)|ǫ/δ(f))
since ǫ ≤ 0.
The probability of κf,ǫ(B) being b or more away from f(B) decreases exponentially in b.
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Proposition 2 (Utility). Pr[|κf,ǫ(B)− f(B)| ≥ b] ≤ 2p
b
1+p .
Proof.
Pr[|κf,ǫ(B)− f(B)| ≥ b]
= 1− Pr[−b < κf,ǫ(B)− f(B) < b]
= 1− Pr[−b+ 1 ≤ κf,ǫ(B)− f(B) ≤ b− 1]
= 1− Pr[−b+ 1 ≤ f(B) +N(m, f(B), exp(−ǫ/δ(f))) − f(B) ≤ b− 1]
= 1− Pr[−b+ 1 ≤ N(m, f(B), exp(−ǫ/δ(f))) ≤ b− 1]
= 1−
b−1∑
n=−b+1
Pr[N(m, f(B), exp(−ǫ/δ(f))) = n]
If b − 1 ≥ m − f(B) and −b + 1 ≤ −m − t, then this is 1 − 1 = 0. If b − 1 < m − f(B) and
−b+ 1 > −m− f(B), then this is
1−
b−1∑
n=−b+1
exp(−ǫ/δ(f))n 1− exp(−ǫ/δ(f))
1 + exp(−ǫ/δ(f))
= 1− 1 + exp(−ǫ/δ(f)) − 2 exp(−ǫ/δ(f))
b
1 + exp(−ǫ/δ(f))
=
2pb
1 + p
If b− 1 < m− f(B) and −b+ 1 ≤ −m− t, then this is
1− p|−m−t| 1
1 + p
+
b−1∑
n=−m−t+1
exp(−ǫ/δ(f))n 1− exp(−ǫ/δ(f))
1 + exp(−ǫ/δ(f))
= 1− 1 + exp(−ǫ/δ(f)) − exp(−ǫ/δ(f))
b
1 + exp(−ǫ/δ(f))
=
pb
1 + p
If b ≥ m− f(B) and −b > −m− t, then this is
1− p|m−t| 1
1 + p
+
m−t−1∑
n=−b+1
exp(−ǫ/δ(f))n 1− exp(−ǫ/δ(f))
1 + exp(−ǫ/δ(f))
= 1− 1 + exp(−ǫ/δ(f)) − exp(−ǫ/δ(f))
b
1 + exp(−ǫ/δ(f))
=
pb
1 + p
completing the proof.
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A.2 An Implementation
Below is an efficient algorithm for sampling from N(m, t, p) for m > 0, −m ≤ t ≤ m, and 0 ≤ p < 1:
01 sample_N(m,t,p)
02 if(flip(p/(1+p)))
03 if(flip(p^(m+t-1)))
04 return(-m-t);
05 else
06 q := (p-1)/(p^(m+t)-p);
07 for(n:=-1; n>-m-t+1; n--)
08 if(flip(q))
09 return(n);
10 q := p*q/(1-q);
11 return(-m-t+1);
12 else
13 if(flip(p^(m-t)))
14 return(m-t);
15 else
16 q := (p-1)*p^t/(p^m-p^t);
17 for(n:=0; n<m-t-1; n++)
18 if(flip(q))
19 return(n);
20 q := p*q/(1-q);
21 return(m-t-1);
Each flip command uses an independent Bernoulli distribution to select either true or false.
flip(p) returns true with probability p.
Proposition 3 (Correctness). sample_N samples from N(m, t, p).
Proof. Let qn denote the value that variable q has the beginning of the nth iteration of the last
for loop: q0 =
(p−1)pt
pm−pt and qn = p ∗ qn−1/(1 − qn−1) for 0 < n < m− t− 1. We show by induction
over n, that for n between 0 and m− t− 2,
qn =
(
1− p
1 + p
)−1
(1− pm−t)−1
n−1∏
j=0
(1− qj)−1pn1− p
1 + p
For the base case with n = 0,
q0 =
(p − 1)pt
pm − pt
=
(
1− p
1 + p
)−1
(1− pm−t)−1 1− p
1 + p
=
(
1− p
1 + p
)−1
(1− pm−t)−1
−1∏
j=0
(1− qj)−1p0 1− p
1 + p
=
(
1− p
1 + p
)−1
(1− pm−t)−1
n−1∏
j=0
(1− qj)−1pn1− p
1 + p
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For the inductive case, assume this is true for n− 1. Then,
qn = p ∗ qn−1/(1− qn−1)
= p ∗

(1− p
1 + p
)
−1
(1− pm−t)−1
(n−1)−1∏
j=0
(1− qj)−1p(n−1) 1− p
1 + p

 ∗ (1− qn−1)−1
=
(
1− p
1 + p
)
−1
(1− pm−t)−1
n−1∏
j=0
(1− qj)−1pn 1− p
1 + p
If the last for loop executes, then with probability
∏n−1
j=0 (1− qj)qn it will stop at the nth iteration
and return n for values of n between 0 to m− t− 2 (inclusive). Using above equation,
n−1∏
j=0
(1− qj)qn
=

n−1∏
j=0
(1− qj)



(1− p
1 + p
)−1
(1− pm−t)−1
n−1∏
j=0
(1− qj)−1pn 1− p
1 + p


=
(
1− p
1 + p
)−1
(1− pm−t)−1pn 1− p
1 + p
Since the probability of the for loop executing is
(
1− p1+p
)
(1 − pm−t), this implies that the
probability of returning n such that 0 ≤ n ≤ m− t− 2 is pn 1−p1+p = p|n| 1−p1+p .
For 0 ≤ n = m−t, the probability of returningm−t is (1− p1+p)pm−t = pm−t∗ 11+p = p|m−t|∗ 11+p .
The probability of the for running until completion and returning m − t − 1 is equal to the
probability that none of the other values of n is returned. That is, the probability flip(p/(1+p))
returning false less the probability of some other number between 0 and m− t being returned:
(1− p
1 + p
)− pm−t ∗ 1
1 + p
−
m−t−2∑
n=0
pj(1− p)/(1 + p) = pm−t−1 1− p
1 + p
= p|m−t−1|
1− p
1 + p
Nearly the same reasoning shows that the negative values for noise also have the correct prob-
abilities.
Assuming that all the operations in sample_N including flip are constant time, sample_N runs
in expected constant time.
Proposition 4 (Runtime Complexity). sample_N runs in O(1) expected time.
Proof. The expected running time is
∑m−t
n=−m−t Pr[N(m, t, p)=n] ∗Tn where Tn is the running time
of sample_N when it produces n. The running time is constant in the case where sample_N produces
m − t or −m − t. The running time Tn is O(|n|) for n such that −m − t < n < m − t. Thus,
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ignoring constants, the expected running time is
m−t−1∑
n=−m−t+1
p|n|
1− p
1 + p
n ≤ 1− p
1 + p
∗ 2 ∗
∑
n=0
max(| −m− t+ 1|,m− t− 1)pnn (1)
≤ 1− p
1 + p
∗ 2 ∗
∑
n=0
∞pnn (2)
=
1− p
1 + p
∗ 2 ∗ p
1− p (3)
=
2p
1 + p
(4)
≤ 2 (5)
where line 3 follows from the expected value of the geometric distribution. (Recall that we are
using p to denote the failure probability unlike most references, which use 1 − p for the failure
probability.) Thus, it is expected to run in constant time.
A.3 Using the Mechanism for the Sanitization Functions COUNT and SUM
We use the above privacy mechanism to implement sanitization functions similar to the ones that
pinq provides. Due to space constraints, we focus on two representative ones: count and sum.
Since we use a bounded discrete privacy mechanism over integers, our implementations differ from
the implementations found in pinq. We force data points to be integers between −100 and 100
whereas pinq bounds the sensitivity of functions by mapping data points to doubles between −1
and 1. (Our range may be made larger without affecting our results.) We then use numbers outside
this range to encode objects other than data points such as queries.
Given these, we implement our pinq-like system as follows. datapoint(y) on line 09 of the
code of Figure 1 would be implemented as a function with body return(-100 <= y && y <= 100).
emptyArray(x)must be implemented to store a value outside of {−100, . . . , 100} so that data points
can be distinguished from empty spots. The program uses numbers larger than 100 to indicate
queries: 101 denotes count and 102 denotes sum. Given 101 or 102, get_sanitization_funct(y)
returns a function that computes the count statistic or sum statistic, respectively. count is com-
puted with
01 count(dPts)
02 count := 0;
03 for(j:=0; j<t; j++)
04 for(k:=0; k<maxPts; k++)
05 if(-100 <= dp[j][k] <= 100)
06 count++;
07 else
08 break;
09 s := t*maxPts/2;
10 noise:=s+sample_N(s,count-s,exp(-e/1));
11 result:=count+noise;
12 return(result);
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and sum with
01 sum(dPts)
02 sum := 0;
03 for(j:=0; j<t; j++)
04 for(k:=0; k<maxPts; k++)
05 if(-100 <= dp[j][k] <= 100)
06 sum := sum+dp[j][k];
07 else
08 break;
09 noise :=
sample_N(t*maxPts*100,sum,exp(-e/100));
10 result := sum+noise;
11 return(result);
where sample_N is as defined above and e stores the value for the privacy bound ǫ. We add and
subtract t*maxPts in the calculation of the noise in count to shift the noise over to keep the value
count positive.
B Automaton Model
B.1 Probability of Action Sequences
We use 〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) to denote the probability of the automaton (starting in state s) producing
the trace ~a and ending in the state s′ after producing the last action of ~a given that the available
inputs are ~i. 〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) is defined as follows:
〈L, s〉(i:~i)(i:~a, s′) =
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)〈L, s′′〉(~i)(~a, s′) if s i→µ
〈L, s〉(~i)(o:~a, s′) =
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)〈L, s′′〉(~i)(~a, s′) if s o→µ
〈L, s〉(~i)([ ], s) = 1
〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) = 0 otherwise
where i ∈ I and o ∈ O. The first line in the above definition, for example, considers the case
where the state s transitions to a new state under the input i according to the distribution µ. It
states the probability of starting in the state s, consuming the input i, and then performing the
actions ~a ending in state s′ given that ~i remain available inputs. This probability is the sum of the
probabilities of transitioning to a state s′′ and then performing the actions ~a from s′′, ending in
state s′ given that ~i are available inputs.
Proposition 5. For all automata 〈L, s〉, ~a in A∗, s′ in S, and~i in I∗, 〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) is well defined
and between 0 and 1.
Proof. Proof by induction over the structure of ~a.
Case: ~a = [ ]. 〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) is 1 if s′ = s, and 〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) is 0 for s′ 6= s.
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Case: ~a = i:~a′. If there does not exist ~i′ such that ~i = i:~i′ and s
i→µ, then 〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) = 0.
If there does exist such a ~i′, then 〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) = ∑s′′∈S µ(s′′)〈L, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′). By the inductive
hypothesis, 〈L, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′) is well defined and between 0 and 1 for all s′′. Since µ is a distribution
over states and the events of being in a state are mutually exclusive,
∑
s′′∈S µ(s
′′) = 1. Let
smax = argmaxs′′∈S〈L, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′).
J〈L, s〉K(~i)(~a, s′) =
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)〈L, s′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′)
≤
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)〈L, smax〉(~i′)(~a′, s′)
= 〈L, smax〉(~i′)(~a′, s′)
≤ 1
Case: ~a = o:~a′. If there does not exist µ such that s
o→µ, then 〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) = 0. If there
does, then 〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) = ∑s′′∈S µ(s′′)〈L, s′′〉(~i)(~a′, s′) and we can use the inductive hypothesis
as above.
A helpful proposition about our model follows.
Proposition 6. For all plts L, states s′, s′′ ∈ S, ~i′ ∈ I∗, and ~h ∈ H∗,
〈L, s′′〉(~i′)(~h:~a′, s′) =
∑
s′′′∈S
〈L, s′′〉([ ])(~h, s′′′) ∗ 〈L, s′′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′)
Proof. Proof by induction over the structure of ~h. In the case where ~h = [ ], 〈L, s′′〉([ ])(~h, s′′′) = 1
when s′′′ = s′′ and 0 otherwise. Thus,∑
s′′′∈S
〈L, s′′〉([ ])([ ], s′′′) ∗ 〈L, s′′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′) = 1 ∗ 〈L, s′′〉([ ]:~i′)(~a′, s′)
= 〈L, s′′〉(~i′)(~h:~a′, s′)
Case: ~h = h:~h′ for some h and ~h′. If s′′
h→µ′, then∑
s′′′∈S
〈L, s′′〉([ ])(h:~h′, s′′′) ∗ 〈L, s′′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′)
=
∑
s′′′∈S
( ∑
s′′′′∈S
µ′(s′′′′)〈L, s′′′′〉([ ])(~h′, s′′′)
)
∗ 〈L, s′′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′)
=
∑
s′′′′∈S
µ′(s′′′′)
∑
s′′′∈S
〈L, s′′′′〉([ ])(~h′, s′′′) ∗ 〈L, s′′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′)
=
∑
s′′′′∈S
µ′(s′′′′)〈L, s′′′′〉(~i′)(~h′:~a′, s′)
= 〈L, s′′〉(~i′)(h:~h′:~a′, s′)
where third line follows from the inductive hypothesis. If for no µ′, then s′′
h→µ′, 〈L, s′′〉(~i′)(~h:~a′, s′) =
0 =
∑
s′′′∈S〈L, s′′〉([ ])(~h, s′′′) ∗ 〈L, s′′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′) since 〈L, s′′〉([ ])(~h, s′′′) = 0 for all s′′′ ∈ S.
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B.2 Extended Transitions
We define s
a⇒ ν so that ν(s′) is the probability of reaching the H-disabled state s′ from the state
s where a is the action performed from state s:
ν(s′) =
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)
∑
~h∈H∗
〈L, s′′〉([ ])(~h, s′) s′ is H-disabled
and ν(s′) = 0 otherwise where s
a→µ. Thus, the probability of reaching the H-disabled state s′
from s by performing the action a followed by a sequence of hidden actions ~h is calculated by
considering each s′′ that is reachable by performing the single action a from s. For each such s′′
we multiply the probability of ending up in s′′ by performing an a from s with the the probability
of reaching s′ from s′′ by performing a sequence of hidden actions (the inner sum). The value ν(s′)
is then calculated by adding the probabilities corresponding to each s′′. Since all ~h in H∗ contain
only actions from H, an execution with the action sequence ~h cannot leave an H-disabled state.
Thus, ν(s′) is the probability of s′ being the first H-disabled state reached. If there is no µ such
that s
a→µ, then there is no ν such that s a⇒ ν.
For notational convenience we extend the transition relation → to S⊥ by having no transitions
to nor from ⊥. This implies that
〈L,⊥〉(~i)([ ],⊥) = 1
〈L, s〉(~i)(~a,⊥) = 1−
∑
s′∈S
〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s)
〈L,⊥〉(~i)(~a, x) = 0 if ~a 6= [ ] or x 6= ⊥
Thus, Pr[ ⌊J〈L,⊥〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e ] is 1 if ~e = [ ] and 0 otherwise, which matches the intuition that a
nonterminating program which never interacts with the data examiner will only have the empty
trace as a prefix.
Proposition 7. For all states s and actions a, s
a⇒ ν implies that ν is a distribution over S⊥.
Proof. To prove that ν is a distribution over S⊥, we must show that for all x ∈ S⊥, 0 ≤ ν(x) ≤ 1
and
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) = 1. We start by proving that
∑
x∈S′ ν(x) ≤ 1 by introducing a function η.
Given the set S′ of H-disabled states, let η be defined as follows:
η(n, s) = 1 s ∈ S′
η(n, s) = 0 when n = 0 and s /∈ S′
η(n, s) =
∑
h∈H
∑
s′′∈S
µh(s
′′)η(n − 1, s′′) otherwise
where s
h→µh and n is a natural number.
Proof by induction over n shows that η(n, s) =
∑
~h∈H≤n
∑
s′∈S′〈L, s〉([ ])(~h, s′). where H≤n =
Hn ∪H≤n−1 for n ≤ 1 and H≤0 = H0 = {[ ]}. In the base case, n = 0, if s ∈ S′, then η(n, s) =
1 =
∑
s′∈S′〈L, s〉([ ])([ ], s′) since 〈L, s〉([ ])([ ], s) = 1, 〈L, s〉([ ])([ ], s′) = 0 for s 6= s′, and s ∈ S′. If
s /∈ S′, η(n, s) = 0 =∑s′∈S′〈L, s〉([ ])([ ], s′) since 〈L, s〉([ ])([ ], s′) = 0 for s 6= s′ and s /∈ S′ whereas
s′ ∈ S′.
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In the inductive case, if s ∈ S′, then 〈L, s〉([ ])(~h, s′) = 0 if ~h 6= [ ] or s′ 6= s since s is H-disabled.
Thus, η(n+ 1, s) = 1 =
∑
~h∈H≤n+1
∑
s′∈S′〈L, s〉([ ])(~h, s′) since 〈L, s〉([ ])([ ], s) = 1. If s /∈ S′, then
η(n + 1, s) =
∑
h∈H
∑
s′′∈S
µh(s
′′)η(n, s′′) (6)
=
∑
h∈H
∑
s′′∈S
µh(s
′′)
∑
~h∈H≤n
∑
s′∈S′
〈L, s〉([ ])(~h, s′) (7)
=
∑
s′∈S′
∑
h∈H
∑
~h∈H≤n
∑
s′′∈S
µh(s
′′)〈L, s〉([ ])(~h, s′) (8)
=
∑
s′∈S′
∑
h∈H
∑
~h∈H≤n
〈L, s〉([ ])(h:~h, s′) (9)
=
∑
s′∈S′
〈
∑
h∈H
∑
~h∈H≤n
〈L, s〉([ ])(h:~h, s′)〉) + 〈L, s〉([ ])([ ], s′) (10)
=
∑
s′∈S′
∑
~h∈H≤n+1
〈L, s〉([ ])(~h, s′) (11)
=
∑
~h∈H≤n+1
∑
s′∈S′
〈L, s〉([ ])(~h, s′) (12)
Line 7 follows from the inductive hypothesis. Line 9 follows since s is H-enabled. Line 10 follows
from 〈L, s〉([ ])([ ], s′) = 0 since s /∈ S′.
Induction over n can also show that 0 ≤ η(n, s) ≤ 1 since µh is always a distribution.
We use η to show the following:∑
s′∈S′
ν(s′) =
∑
s′∈S′
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)
∑
~h∈H∗
〈L, s′′〉([ ])(~h, s′)
=
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)
∑
~h∈H∗
∑
s′∈S′
〈L, s′′〉([ ])(~h, s′)
=
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′) lim
n→∞
∑
~h∈H≤n
∑
s′∈S′
〈L, s′′〉([ ])(~h, s′)
=
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′) lim
n→∞
η(n, s′′)
≤
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)1
≤ 1
where s
a→µ.
For all s′ ∈ S, if s′ is H-enabled, ν(s′) = 0. Thus, ∑s∈S ν(s) =∑s′∈S′ ν(s′) ≤ 1. Furthermore,
for all s ∈ S, 0 ≤ ν(s) and 0 ≤∑s∈S ν(s) since no operations that could introduce negative numbers
is every used in computing ν(s). Since ν(⊥) = 1−∑s∈S ν(s), 0 ≤ ν(⊥) ≤ 1 and ∑x∈S⊥ ν(x) = 1.
Since for all s, 0 ≤ ν(s) and ∑s∈S ν(s) ≤ 1, it must be the case that ν(s) ≤ 1.
Given such an automaton M = 〈L, s〉, we define JMK to be a function from input sequences to
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a distribution over trace prefixes (finite action sequences).
Pr[ JMK(~i)⊒~a ] =
∑
s′∈S
M(~i)(~a, s′)
We write ⌊~a⌋E for restricting the action sequence ~a to some subset E of A. Formally, ⌊[ ]⌋E = [ ],
⌊a:~a⌋E = a:⌊~a⌋E if a ∈ E, and ⌊a:~a⌋E = ⌊~a⌋E , otherwise. For infinite sequences ~a with only a finite
number of elements from E, ⌊~a⌋E is the finite sequence that results from ⌊~a′⌋E where ~a′ is the finite
prefix of ~a holding all the elements from E. If ~a contains an infinite number of elements from E,
then ⌊~a⌋E is the infinite sequence whose jth entry is the jth element of E in ~a.
Given an automaton M , Pr[⌊JMK(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e] is the probability of the data examiner seeing
~e ∈ E∗ as a prefix given that the available inputs are ~i. To calculate Pr[⌊JMK(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e], consider
the set γ(~e) of action sequences ~a such that ⌊~a⌋E = ~e and ends with the last element of ~e. That is,
γ(~e) = {~a ∈ A∗ | ⌊~a⌋E = ~e ∧ last(~a) = last(~e) } with the special case that γ([ ]) = {[ ]}. To calculate
Pr[⌊JMK(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e], we need not consider all ~a such that ⌊~a⌋E = ~e. Rather, we may focus only on
those in γ(~e) since every ~a such that ⌊~a⌋E = ~e will have a prefix in γ(~e). Since it is impossible to
see two different prefixes from γ(~e) during the same execution (no element of γ(~e) is the prefix of
another), they are mutually exclusive. Thus, Pr[⌊JMK(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e] =
∑
~a∈γ(~e) Pr[JMK(
~i) ⊒ ~e].
B.3 Some Helpful Propositions
We need some propositions about our model to prove the soundness of unwinding later in Ap-
pendix E.
Let H∗:γ(~e′) stand for {~a ∈ A∗ | ∃~h ∈ H∗,∃~a′′ ∈ γ(~e′),~a = ~h:~a′′ }.
We use γ′(~e) do denote those action sequences of γ(~e) that do not start with a hidden output
from H: γ′(~e) = {~a ∈ γ(~e) | ~a = [ ] ∨ ∃a ∈ A−H,∃~a′ ∈ A∗,~a = a:~a′ } where A − H is the set
difference.
Proposition 8. For all ~e ∈ E∗, if ~e 6= [ ], then H∗:γ′(~e) = γ(~e).
Proof. To show that H∗:γ′(~e) ⊆ γ(~e), note that for all ~a ∈ H∗:γ′(~e), there exists ~h ∈ H∗ and
~a′ ∈ γ′(~e) ⊆ γ(~e) such that ~a = ~h:~a′. Furthermore, ⌊~h:~a′⌋E = ⌊~a′⌋E = ~e′ since H ∩ E = ∅. Since
~e 6= [ ], ~a 6= [ ] and last(~h:~a′) = last(~a′) = last(~e). Thus, ~h:~a′ ∈ γ(~e).
To show that γ(~e′) ⊆ H∗:γ′(~e), for any ~a ∈ γ(~e′), either ~a ∈ H∗ or there exists ~h ∈ H∗,
a ∈ A − H, and ~a′ ∈ A∗ such that ~a = ~h:a:~a′. The first case cannot arise since it would imply
that ~e = [ ] since ~e = ⌊~a⌋E = [ ]. For the second case, since ~e = ⌊~h:a:~a′⌋E = ⌊a:~a′⌋E and last(~e) =
last(~h:a:~a′) = last(a:~a′). Thus, a:~a′ ∈ γ(~e). Thus, ~h:a:~a′ ∈ H∗:γ′(~e).
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Proposition 9.
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(i:~i)⊒i:~a ] =
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′) Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i)⊒~a ]
if s
i→µ and i ∈ I
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i)⊒o:~a ] =
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′) Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i)⊒~a ]
if s
o→µ and o ∈ O
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i)⊒[ ] ] = 1
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i)⊒~a ] = 0 otherwise
and 0 ≤ Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i)⊒~a ] ≤ 1.
Proof. For the first equation:
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(i:~i)⊒i:~a ] =
∑
s′′∈S
〈L, s〉(i:~i)(i:~a, s′′)
=
∑
s′′∈S
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′)〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′′)
=
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′)
∑
s′∈S
〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′′)
=
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′) Pr[ 〈L, s〉(~i)⊒~a ]
For the second equation:
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i)⊒o:~a ] =
∑
s′′∈S
〈L, s〉(~i)(o:~a, s′′)
=
∑
s′′∈S
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′)〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′′)
=
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′)
∑
s′∈S
〈L, s〉(~i)(~a, s′′)
=
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′) Pr[ 〈L, s〉(~i)⊒~a ]
For the third equation: Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i)⊒[ ] ] = ∑s′∈S〈L, s〉(~i)([ ], s′) = 1 since 〈L, s〉(~i)([ ], s) = 1
and 〈L, s〉(~i)([ ], s′) = 0 for all s′ 6= s.
For the forth equation: Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i)⊒~a ] = ∑s′∈S〈L, s〉(~i)([ ], s′) = 0 since 〈L, s〉(~i)([ ], s′) = 0
for all s′.
To show that 0 ≤ Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i)⊒~a ] ≤ 1, we use proof by induction over the structure of ~a.
Case: ~a = [ ]. J〈L, s〉K(~i)(~a) is 1.
Case: ~a = i:~a′. If there does not exist ~i′ such that ~i = i:~i′ and s
i→µ, then J〈L, s〉K(~i)(~a) = 0.
If there does exist such a ~i′, then J〈L, s〉K(~i)(~a) = ∑s′∈S µ(s′)J〈L, s′〉K(~i′)(~a′). By the inductive
hypothesis, J〈L, s′〉K(~i′)(~a′) is well defined and between 0 and 1 for all s′. Since µ is a distribution
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over states and the events of being in a state are mutually exclusive,
∑
s′∈S µ(s
′) = 1. Let smax =
argmaxs′∈SJ〈L, s′〉K(~i′)(~a′).
J〈L, s〉K(~i)(~a) =
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′)J〈L, s′〉K(~i′)(~a′) ≤
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′)J〈L, smax〉K(~i′)(~a′)
= J〈L, smax〉K(~i′)(~a′)
≤ 1
Case: ~a = o:~a′. If there does not exist µ such that s
o→µ, then J〈L, s〉K(~i)(~a) = 0. If there
does, then J〈L, s〉K(~i)(~a) = ∑s′∈S µ(s′)J〈L, s′〉K(~i)(~a′) and we can use the inductive hypothesis as
above.
Proposition 10. For all H-disabled states s, a in D∪Q∪R, ~e in E∗, and~i in I∗, if ~e 6= [ ], s a→µ,
and s
a⇒ ν, then∑
~a∈γ(~e)
∑
s′∈S
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′) ∗ 〈L, s′′〉(~i)(~a, s′) =
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e ]
Proof. ∑
~a∈γ(~e)
∑
s′∈S
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′) ∗ 〈L, s′′〉(~i)(~a, s′) (13)
=
∑
s′∈S
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)
∑
~a∈γ(~e)
〈L, s′′〉(~i)(~a, s′) (14)
=
∑
s′∈S
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)
∑
~a∈H∗:γ′(~e)
〈L, s′′〉(~i)(~a, s′) (15)
=
∑
s′∈S
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)
∑
~h∈H∗
∑
~a∈γ′(~e)
〈L, s′′〉(~i)(~h:~a, s′) (16)
=
∑
s′∈S
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)
∑
~h∈H∗
∑
~a∈γ(~e)
∑
s′′′∈S
〈L, s′′〉([ ])(~h, s′′′) ∗ 〈L, s′′′〉(~i)(~a, s′) (17)
=
∑
s′∈S
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)
∑
~h∈H∗
∑
~a∈γ(~e)
∑
s′′′∈S′
〈L, s′′〉([ ])(~h, s′′′) ∗ 〈L, s′′′〉(~i)(~a, s′) (18)
=
∑
s′′′∈S′

∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′)
∑
~h∈H∗
〈L, s′′〉([ ])(~h, s′′′)

 ∑
~a∈γ(~e)
∑
s′∈S
〈L, s′′′〉(~i)(~a, s′) (19)
=
∑
s′′′∈S′
ν(s′′′)
∑
~a∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s′′′〉K(~i)⊒~a ] (20)
=
∑
s′′′∈S′
ν(s′′′) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s′′′〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e ] (21)
=
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e ] (22)
where S′ is the subset of states S that are H-disabled. Line 15 follows from Proposition 8. Line 16
follows since there is a one-to-one correspondence between elements of H∗:γ′(~e) and H∗×γ′(~e) given
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as ~a ∈ H∗:γ′(~e) corresponding to 〈~h,~a〉 where ~h is the largest sequence of H∗ such that ~a = ~h:~a′
for some ~a′. Line 17 follows from Proposition 6. Line 18 follows since ~a ∈ γ′(~e) starting with an
action not in H implies that 〈L, s′′′〉(~i)(~a, s′) = 0 for any state that is H-enabled. Line 22 follows
from Pr[ ⌊J〈L,⊥〉K(~i)⌋E⊒e:~e ] = 0 since e:~e 6= [ ] and ν(s′′′) = 0 for any H-enabled state s′′′.
Informally speaking the following proposition shows how we can account for transitions on
hidden actions in calculating the probability of observing a particular behavior from a given state.
The first part of the proposition states that the probability of observing the sequence ~e starting
from the state s given the input sequence d:~i′ can be calculated by considering those states that
are reachable from s by performing the action d followed by a sequence of hidden actions. For
each such reachable state we take the probability of being in that state and multiply it with the
probability of observing the sequence ~e from that state given the input sequence~i′. The other parts
can be explained analogously.
Proposition 11. For all plts, s ∈ S, d ∈ D, q ∈ Q, r ∈ R, ~i,~i′ ∈ I∗, and ~e,~e′ ∈ E∗,
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(d:~i′)⌋E⊒~e ]
=
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒~e ] where s d⇒ ν
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(q:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ]
=
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒~e′ ] where s q⇒ ν
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ]
=
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ] where s r⇒ ν
Proof. For the first equality of the proposition: Note that if ~e = [ ], then
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(d:~i′)⌋E⊒~e ] = 1 =
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒~e ]
Otherwise, since s
d⇒ ν, we know there exists µ such that s d→µ. It follows that
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(d:~i′)⌋E⊒~e ] =
∑
~a∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(d:~i′)⊒~a ] (23)
=
∑
~a′∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(d:~i′)⊒d:~a′ ] (24)
=
∑
~a′∈γ(~e)
∑
s′∈S
〈L, s〉(d:~i′)(d:~a′, s′) (25)
=
∑
~a′∈γ(~e)
∑
s′∈S
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′) ∗ 〈L, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′) (26)
=
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒~e ] (27)
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Line 24 follows since s
d→µ implies that s does not transition under any outputs and ~e 6= [ ] implies
that ~a ∈ γ(~e) cannot be [ ]. Thus, we know that the first action of ~a must be of the form d:~a′
for Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(d:~i′)⊒~a ] to be non-zero. Since ⌊d:~a′⌋E = ~e and d /∈ E, ⌊~a′⌋E = ~e. Furthermore,
last(~a′) = last(~a) = last(~e). Thus, ~a′ ∈ γ(~e). Line 27 follows from Proposition 10.
For the second equality of the proposition: Note that if ~e′ = [ ], then
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(q:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] = 1 =
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒~e′ ]
Otherwise, since s
q⇒ ν, we know there exists µ such that s q→µ. It follows that
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(q:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] =
∑
~a∈γ(q:~e′)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(q:~i′)⊒~a ] (28)
=
∑
~a′∈γ(~e′)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(q:~i′)⊒q:~a′ ] (29)
=
∑
~a′∈γ(~e′)
∑
s′∈S
〈L, s〉(q:~i′)(q:~a′, s′) (30)
=
∑
~a′∈γ(~e′)
∑
s′∈S
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′) ∗ 〈L, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′) (31)
=
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (32)
Line 29 follows since s
q→µ implies that s does not transition under any outputs and ~e′ 6= [ ]
implies that ~a′ ∈ γ(~e′) cannot be [ ]. Thus, we know that the first action of ~a must be of the
form q:~a′ for Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(q:~i′)⊒~a ] to be non-zero. Since ⌊q:~a′⌋E = q:~e′, ⌊~a′⌋E = ~e′. Furthermore,
last(~a′) = last(~a) = last(~e′). Thus, ~a′ ∈ γ(~e′). Line 32 follows from Proposition 10.
For the third equality of the proposition: Note that if ~e′ = [ ], then
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] = 1 =
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ]
Otherwise, since s
r⇒ ν, we know there exists µ such that s r→µ. It follows that
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] =
∑
~a∈γ(r:~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i)⊒~a ] (33)
=
∑
~a′∈γ(~e′)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i)⊒r:~a′ ] (34)
=
∑
~a∈γ(~e′)
∑
s′∈S
〈L, s〉(~i)(r:~a′, s′) (35)
=
∑
~a∈γ(~e′)
∑
s′∈S
∑
s′′∈S
µ(s′′) ∗ 〈L, s′′〉(~i)(~a′, s′) (36)
=
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (37)
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Line 34 follows since s
r→µ implies that s does not transition under any action other than r and
~e′ 6= [ ] implies that ~a′ ∈ γ(~e′) cannot be [ ]. Thus, we know that the first action of ~a must be of
the form r:~a′ for Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i)⊒~a ] to be non-zero. Since ⌊r:~a′⌋E = r:~e′, ⌊~a′⌋E = ~e′. Furthermore,
last(~a′) = last(~a) = last(~e′). Thus, ~a′ ∈ γ(~e′). Line 37 follows from Proposition 10.
C Basic Properties of Differential Noninterference
Sequence Differencing. Given the input sequences ~i1 and ~i2, ∆(~i1,~i2) denotes the number of
data points on which they differ: the minimum total number of data point insertions into ~i1 and
~i2 it takes to make them equal. Formally,
• ∆(~i1,~i2) = 0 iff ~i1 =~i2.
• For 1 ≤ n, ∆(~i1,~i2) = n iff there exists d ∈ D, ~i,~i′1,~i′2 ∈ I∗, such that both of the following
properties hold:
– either ~i1 =~i:d:~i
′
1 and ~i2 =~i:~i
′
2, or ~i1 =~i:~i
′
1 and ~i2 =~i:d:~i
′
2; and
– ∆(~i′1,~i
′
2) = n− 1.
For ∆(~i1,~i2) = n to hold for any n, ~i1 and ~i2 must agree on every query from Q: they may
only differ by n data points from D. Since differential privacy is defined using data sets differing
on one element, in most theorems we are interested in the case where ∆(~i1,~i2) = 1, which means
that there exists d ∈ D, and ~i,~i′ ∈ I∗ such that either ~i1 = ~i:d:~i′ and ~i2 = ~i:~i′, or ~i2 = ~i:d:~i′ and
~i1 =~i:~i
′.
For example, let d1 and d2 range over elements in D, and q1 and q2 range over elements in Q.
• ∆([d1, q1, d2], [d1, q1]) = 1 (add d2 to the end of the second sequence to get the first).
• ∆([q1, d2, q2], [d1, q1, d2, q2]) = 1 (add d1 to the front of the first to get the second).
• ∆([d1, q1, d2, q2], [d1, q1, q2]) = 1 (add d2 between q1 and q2 of the second to get the first).
• ∆([d1, d2, q1, q2], [d1, d2, q2, q1]) is undefined (the two sequences do not agree on queries).
Note that in the first example, the two sequences have a difference of one under the above definition
but do not have a Hamming distance since they are of different lengths.
While the choice of using all possible subsets of the set of trace prefixes instead of a single
prefix makes the power of differential noninterference more apparent, it does not actually impose a
stronger requirement as shown by the next lemma. This result simplifies reasoning about differential
noninterference and is useful for proving subsequent results in this paper.
Proposition 12. m has ǫ-differential noninterference if and only if for all input sequences ~i1 and
~i2 in I such that ∆(~i1,~i2) ≤ 1 and ~e in E∗,
Pr[⌊m(~i1)⌋E ⊒ ~e] ≤ exp(ǫ) ∗ Pr[⌊m(~i2)⌋E ⊒ ~e]
Proof. The only if direction follows directly from the definition by setting S = {~e}.
For the if direction, arbitrarily fix~i1 and~i2 such that ∆(~i1,~i2) ≤ 1 and S ⊆ E∗. By assumption,
for all ~e in E∗,
Pr[⌊m(~i1)⌋E ⊒ ~e] ≤ exp(ǫ) ∗ Pr[⌊m(~i2)⌋E ⊒ ~e]
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Let S′ be S with all the elements that are a longer version of another element of S removed.
That is, S′ = {~e′ ∈ S | ∄~e ∈ S s.t. ~e′ ⊐ ~e } where ~e′ ⊐ ~e means that ~e′ is a strict prefix of ~e. Proof by
induction over the length of ~e shows that for all ~e in S, there exists ~e′ in S′ such that ~e ⊒ ~e′. Thus,
if there exists ~e in S such that ⌊m(~i1)⌋E ⊒ ~e, then there exists ~e′ in S′ such that ⌊m(~i1)⌋E ⊒ ~e′.
Thus, for all ~i, Pr[⌊m(~i)⌋E ⊒ S] = Pr[⌊m(~i)⌋E ⊒ S′].
For two ~e′1 and ~e
′
2 in S
′ such that ~e′1 6= ~e′2, ⌊m(~i)⌋E can only have one of them as a prefix since
neither is a prefix of the other. Thus, since S is countable, this implies that
Pr[⌊m(~i)⌋E ⊒ S] =
∑
~e′∈S′
Pr[⌊m(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e′]
Thus,
Pr[⌊m(~i1)⌋E ⊒ S] = Pr[⌊m(~i1)⌋E ⊒ S′]
=
∑
~e′∈S′
Pr[⌊m(~i1)⌋E ⊒ ~e′]
≤
∑
~e′∈S′
exp(ǫ) ∗ Pr[⌊m(~i2)⌋E ⊒ ~e′]
= exp(ǫ)
∑
~e′∈S′
Pr[⌊m(~i2)⌋E ⊒ ~e′]
= exp(ǫ) Pr[⌊m(~i2)⌋E ⊒ S′]
= exp(ǫ) Pr[⌊m(~i2)⌋E ⊒ S]
The next theorem is analogous to previous results about differential privacy for functions: it
proves that the privacy leakage bound for a system whose inputs differ on at most n data points
is n ∗ ǫ where ǫ is the leakage bound for the system if its inputs differ on one data point (see e.g.,
corollary of [MT07]).
Proposition 13. If a system m has ǫ-differential noninterference, then for all input sequences ~i1
and ~i2 such that ∆(~i1,~i2) ≤ n and for all S ⊆ E∗,
Pr[⌊JMK(~i1)⌋E ⊒ S] ≤ exp(n ∗ ǫ) ∗ Pr[⌊JMK(~i2)⌋E ⊒ S]
Proof. Proof by induction over n.
Base Case: n = 0. In this case, ~i1 = ~i2 and, thus, Pr[⌊m(~i1)⌋E ⊒ S] = Pr[⌊m(~i2)⌋E ⊒ S] as
needed with exp(0) = 1.
Inductive Case: Assume for all n′ ≤ n; prove for n + 1. Since ∆(~i1,~i2) = n + 1, there must
exist ~i,~i′1,~i
′
2 ∈ I∗ and d1 ∈ D such that ~i1 = ~i:d1:~i′1, ~i2 = ~i:~i′2, and ∆(~i′1,~i′2) = n. Let ~i3 = ~i:i2:~i′1.
∆(~i1,~i3) = 1 and ∆(~i3,~i2) = n. Thus, by the inductive hypothesis,
Pr[⌊m(~i1)⌋E ⊒ S] ≤ exp(1 ∗ ǫ) ∗ Pr[⌊m(~i3)⌋E ⊒ S]
and
Pr[⌊m(~i3)⌋E ⊒ S] ≤ exp(n ∗ ǫ) ∗ Pr[⌊m(~i2)⌋E ⊒ S]
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Thus,
Pr[⌊m(~i1)⌋E ⊒ S] ≤ exp(1 ∗ ǫ) ∗
(
exp(n ∗ ǫ) ∗ Pr[⌊m(~i2)⌋E ⊒ S]
)
= exp(n+ 1 ∗ ǫ) ∗ Pr[⌊m(~i2)⌋E ⊒ S]
as needed.
D Compositional Reasoning
To prove Theorem 1, we use a definition and a proposition that helps us to track when the transition
under h† is being simulated by many transitions of M2.
Let L1 = 〈S1, Q1 ⊎ D1, R1 ⊎ H1,→1〉 and L2 = 〈S2, ∅,H2,→2〉 and M2 = 〈L2, s02〉. Let A3 =
Q1 ⊎ D1 ⊎ R1 ⊎ H1 ⊎H2 ⊎ {h‡}. Let h† be a distinguished internal action in H1. For simplicity,
we assume that h† only labels the one transition of L1 that is implemented by M2. Let h
‡ be a
distinguished internal action not in H1 or H2.
Let Ψ(~a) be a set of action sequences formed by replacing each action h† in ~a with the internal
action h‡ followed by any sequence ~h from H+2 and then h
‡ again. Formally,
Ψ(h†:~a) = h‡:H+2 :h
‡:Ψ(~a)
Ψ(a:~a) = a:Ψ(~a) where a 6= h†
where : is raised to work over sets in the standard way: for X ⊆ A∗ and Y ⊆ A∗, X:Y =
{~a ∈ A∗ | ∃~a1 ∈ X,∃~a2 ∈ Y s.t. ~a = ~a1:~a2 } and a:X = {a}:X.
Proposition 14. Let M1 = 〈L1, s0〉 and let M3 = M1[s†,M2, ι] = 〈L3, s0〉 where M2 implements
the transition of h† under ι. For all ~a, ~i, for all s ∈ S,∑
s′∈S1
〈L1, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) =
∑
~a′∈Ψ(a)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L3, s〉(~i)(~a′, s′)
Proof. We use induction over the structure of ~a.
Case: ~a = [ ]. Since Ψ([ ]) = {[ ]}, 〈L1, s〉(~i)([ ], s′) = 〈L3, s〉(~i)([ ], s′) = 1.
Case: ~a = i:~a′.
• Subcase: there does not exist~i′ such that~i = i:~i′ and s i→1 µ. In this subcase, 〈L1, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) =
0. By definition of Ψ we have that ∀~a′′ ∈ Ψ(~a) = Ψ(i:~a′) and ~a′′ is of the form i:~a′′′ for some
~a′′′. Since, by definition of →3, M3 has an input transition from a state only if it has an
input transition from that same state in M1 there does not exist s
i→3 µ. It follows that for
all ∀~a′′ ∈ Ψ(~a), 〈L3, s〉(~i)(~a′′, s′) = 0, as needed.
• Subcase: there does exist ~i′ such that ~i = i:~i′ and s i→1 µ. In this subcase,
〈L1, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) =
∑
s′′∈S1
µ1(s
′′)〈L1, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′) where s i→1 µ1
and
〈L3, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) =
∑
s′′∈S1⊎S2
µ2(s
′′)〈L3, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′) where s i→3 µ2.
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Since each ~a′′ ∈ Ψ(~a) is of the form i:~a′′′ for some ~a′′′, we need to show that
∑
s′∈S1
∑
s′′∈S1
µ1(s
′′)〈L1, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′) =
∑
i:~a′′′∈Ψ(~a)
∑
s′∈S1
∑
s′′∈S1⊎S2
µ2(s
′′)〈L3, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′′′, s′).
We reason as follows:∑
i:~a′′′∈Ψ(~a)
∑
s′∈S1
∑
s′′∈S1⊎S2
µ2(s
′′)〈L3, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′′′, s′) (38)
=
∑
s′′∈S1⊎S2
µ2(s
′′)
∑
i:~a′′′∈Ψ(~a)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L3, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′′′, s′) (39)
=
∑
s′′∈S1
µ2(s
′′)
∑
i:~a′′′∈Ψ(~a)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L3, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′′′, s′) (40)
=
∑
s′′∈S1
µ2(s
′′)
∑
~a′′′∈Ψ(~a′)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L3, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′′′, s′) (41)
=
∑
s′′∈S1
µ1(s
′′)
∑
~a′′′∈Ψ(~a′)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L3, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′′′, s′) (42)
=
∑
s′∈S1
∑
s′′∈S1
µ1(s
′′)〈L1, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′) (43)
Line 39 follows from reordering summations and using distributivity of multiplication over
summation. Line 40 follows from the fact that any s′′ ∈ Supp(µ2) can not be in S2 since
any s′′ ∈ Supp(µ2) is reachable via an input action. Line 41 follows from, the fact that
each ~a′′ ∈ Ψ(~a) is of the form i:~a′′′ and ~a′′′ ∈ Ψ(~a′). Line 42 follows from definition
of →3. We conclude in Line 43 using the inductive hypothesis
∑
s′∈S1
〈L1, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′, s′) =∑
~a′′′∈Ψ(~a′)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L3, s′′〉(~i′)(~a′′′, s′).
Case: ~a = o:~a′.
• Subcase: o 6= h†.
– Subsubcase: there does not exist ~a′ such that ~a = o:~a′ and s
a→1 µ. In this subcase,
〈L1, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) = 0. By case definition we know a = o:a′ where o ∈ R1 ⊎H1 and o 6= h†.
Then, ∀~a′′ ∈ Ψ(~a) = Ψ(o:~a′), ~a′′ is of the form o:~a′′′ for some ~a′′′. Since, by definition
of →3, M3 has an output transition on an action from R1 ⊎H1 \ {h†} only if it has the
same transition M1. This gives 〈L3, s〉(~i)(~a′′, s′) = 0 for all ∀~a′′ ∈ Ψ(~a), as needed.
– Subsubcase: there does exist ~a′ such that ~a = o:~a′ and s
o→1 µ. In this subcase, the proof
follows a line of reasoning analogous to the case where ~a = i:~a′. We show that
∑
s′∈S1
∑
s′′∈S1
µ1(s
′′)〈L1, s′′〉(~i)(~a′, s′) =
∑
o:~a′′′∈Ψ(~a)
∑
s′∈S1
∑
s′′∈S1⊎S2
µ2(s
′′)〈L3, s′′〉(~i)(~a′′′, s′).
In the step where we argue that s′′ /∈ S2, we use the fact that all states in S2 can only
result from a transition on h‡ or an action from H2, and that o ∈ R1 ⊎H1 \ {h†}, which
is disjoint from {h‡} ⊎H2.
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• Subcase: o = h†.
– Subsubcase: there does not exist µ such that s
h†→1 µ, then 〈L1, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) = 0 and s 6= s†.
In this case all ~a′′ ∈ Ψ(~a) start with h‡~hh‡ for some vector ~h of actions from H2+. Since
s 6= s†, according to the definition of →3 the only way for s to have a transition on
h‡ is if s = ι(s1) for some s1 ∈ Supp(µ†), where s† h
†→1 µ† and that h‡ transition is
ι(s1)
h‡→3 Dirac(s1). By definition of →3, s1 can only transition on actions present in M1,
which means it cannot transition on any actions from H2. This makes it impossible for
h‡ to be followed by a sequence ~h from actions H2, and gives 〈L3, s〉(~i)(~a′′, s′) = 0 for all
~a′′ ∈ Ψ(~a), as needed.
– Subsubcase: there does exist µ such that s
h†→1 µ, then by the assumption that s† is the
unique state enabling h† we know that s = s† and by transition-determinism s†
h†→µ†.
We need to show that
∑
s′∈S1
∑
s′′∈S1
µ†(s′′)〈L1, s′′〉(~i)(~a′, s′) =
∑
~a′′∈Ψ(~a)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L3, s†〉(~i)(~a′′, s′).
We reason as follows:∑
~a′′∈Ψ(~a)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L3, s†〉(~i)(~a′′, s′) (44)
=
∑
h‡:~h:h‡:~a′′′∈Ψ(~a)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L3, s†〉(~i)(h‡:~h:h‡:~a′′′, s′) (45)
=
∑
h‡:~h:h‡∈ ~a′′′∈Ψ(~a)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L3, s02〉(~i)(~h:h‡:~a′′′, s′) (46)
=
∑
h‡:~h:h‡~a′′′∈Ψ(~a)
∑
s′∈S1
∑
s′′′∈S1⊎S2
〈L3, s02〉([ ])(~h, s′′′) ∗ 〈L3, s′′′〉(~i)(h‡:~a′′′, s′) (47)
=
∑
h‡:~h:h‡~a′′′∈Ψ(~a)
∑
s′∈S1
∑
s′′′∈ι(S†)
〈L3, s02〉([ ])(~h, s′′′) ∗ 〈L3, s′′′〉(~i)(h‡:~a′′′, s′) (48)
=
∑
h‡:~h:h‡~a′′′∈Ψ(~a)
∑
s′∈S1
∑
s′′′∈ι(S†)
〈L3, s02〉([ ])(~h, s′′′) ∗ 〈L3, s4〉(~i)(~a′′′, s′) (49)
where s′′′
h‡→3Dirac(s4) (50)
=
∑
s′′′∈ι(S†)
(
∑
~h∈(H2)+
〈L3, s†〉([ ])(~h, s′′′)) ∗
∑
s′∈S1
∑
~a′′′∈Ψ(~a′)
〈L3, s4〉(~i)(~a′′′, s′) (51)
where s′′′
h‡→3Dirac(s4) (52)
=
∑
s′′′∈ι(S†)
µ†(s′′′)
∑
s′∈S1
∑
~a′′′∈Ψ(~a′)
〈L3, s4〉(~i)(~a′′′, s′) (53)
For Lines 44 to 47 we observe that by definition of Ψ each ~a′′ ∈ Ψ(~a) is of the form
h‡:~h:h‡:~a′′′ where ~h 6= [ ], by definition of →3, s† h
‡→3 Dirac(s02) and use Proposition 6.
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For Line 48 let ι(S†) = {s ∈ L2 | s = ι(s′) for some s′ ∈ Supp(µ†)}. The equation
follows since 〈L3, s02〉([ ])(~h, s′′′) = 0 for all s′′′ ∈ S1, by the assumption that for all
s ∈ Supp(µ†), µ†(s) =∑~h∈(H2)+ M2([ ])(~h, ι(s)) and that µ is a probability distribution.
By definition of →3 we know that ι(s1) h
‡→3Dirac(s1) for all s1 ∈ Supp(µ†) and Line 50
follows. Note that by definition of →3 and ι(S†) where since ι is an injection we know
that for each s′′′ ∈ ι(S†) there is a unique state s4 ∈ Supp(µ†) such that s′′′ = ι(s4). By
using distributivity of multiplication over addition and the fact that ~a′′′ ∈ Ψ(~a′) we get
Line 52. Line 53 follows from the assumption that for all s ∈ Supp(µ†),
µ†(s) =
∑
~h∈(H′)+
M ′([ ])(~h, ι(s)).
To conclude this case we recall that for each s′′′ ∈ ι(S†) there is a unique state s4 ∈
Supp(µ†) such that s′′′ = ι(s4) and use the inductive hypothesis.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let M1 = 〈L1, s0〉 and let M3 = M1[s†,M2, ι] = 〈L3, s0〉. We show that
for all ~i in I∗, and ~e in E∗, s in S1, Pr[ ⌊〈L1, s〉(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e ] = Pr[ ⌊〈L3, s〉(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e ]. By expanding
the definitions of Pr[ ⌊〈L1, s〉(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e ] and Pr[ ⌊〈L3, s〉(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e ] we get
Pr[ ⌊〈L1, s〉(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e ] =
∑
~a∈γ1(~e)
Pr[ 〈L1, s〉(~i) ⊒ ~e]
=
∑
~a∈γ1(~e)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L1, s〉(~i)(~a, s′)
and
Pr[ ⌊〈L3, s〉(~i)⌋E ⊒ ~e ] =
∑
~a∈γ3(~e)
Pr[ 〈L3, s〉(~i) ⊒ ~e]
=
∑
~a∈γ3(~e)
∑
s′∈S1⊎S2
〈L3, s〉(~i)(~a, s′)
where γ1 and γ3 are sets of sequences of actions, respectively, of M1 and M3 defined as follows:
γ1(~e) = {~a ∈ A∗1 | ⌊~a⌋E1 = ~e ∧ last(~a) = last(~e) } with the special case that γ1([ ]) = {[ ]}, and
γ3(~e) = {~a ∈ A∗3 | ⌊~a⌋E3 = ~e ∧ last(~a) = last(~e) } with the special case that γ3([ ]) = {[ ]} (as justified
at the end of Appendix B). Note that we use Ai for the set of all actions of Mi and Ei for the set
of observable actions of Mi.
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Now we show that for all s ∈ S1, ~i, ~e,∑
~a∈γ1(~e)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L1, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) =
∑
~a∈γ1(~e)
∑
~a′∈Ψ(a)
∑
s′∈S1
〈L3, s〉(~i)(~a′, s′) (54)
=
∑
~a∈γ1(~e)
∑
~a′∈Ψ(a)
∑
s′∈S1⊎S2
〈L3, s〉(~i)(~a′, s′) (55)
=
∑
~a∈Φ(~e)
∑
s′∈S1⊎S2
〈L3, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) (56)
=
∑
~a∈γ3(~e)
∑
s′∈S1⊎S2
〈L3, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) (57)
where Φ(~e) =
⋃
~a∈γ1(~e)
Ψ(~a), and Ψ is as defined at the top of this section.
Line 54 follows from Proposition 14.
For Line 55, we argue as follows: Since M2 has no external actions and all transitions of M3
on external actions end in a state in S1 \ S2, for those states s′ ∈ S2, s′ is reachable via a hidden
action only. Thus, for any~i, any ~a ∈ γ3(~e), 〈L3, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) = 0 since ~a ends in an observable action
from E by definition of γ3.
Line 56 follows from the definition of Φ and the fact that for any pair of sequences ~a1, ~a2 such
that ~a1 6= ~a2, Ψ( ~a1) ∩Ψ( ~a2) = ∅.
For Line 57 we observe that any sequence ~a ∈ γ3(~e)\Φ(~e) must have an occurrence of the action
h‡ that is neither immediately preceded by a subsequence of the form h‡:~h or immediately followed
by a subsequence of the form ~h:h‡. Then, by definition of →3, 〈L3, s〉(~i)(~a, s′) = 0 for all sequences
~a ∈ γ3(~e) \ Φ(~e), giving the needed equation.
E Proof of Soundness of Unwinding
E.1 A Helpful Proposition
Proposition 15. If β is a bijection from Supp(ν1) to Supp(ν2) and for all x
′
1 ∈ Supp(ν1), | ln ν1(x′1)−
ln ν2(β(x
′
1))| ≤ δ, then∑
x′
1
∈Supp(ν1)
ν1(x
′
1) exp(ǫ
′ − δ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, β(x′1)〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ]
≤ exp(ǫ′)
∑
x′
2
∈S⊥
ν2(x
′
2) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′2〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ]
Proof. For all x′1 in Supp(ν1),
ν1(x
′
1) exp(ǫ
′ − δ) = ν1(x
′
1)
ν2(β(x′1))
ν2(β(x
′
1)) exp(ǫ
′ − δ) (58)
= exp(ln(ν1(x
′
1))− ln(ν2(β(x′1))))ν2(β(x′1)) exp(ǫ′ − δ) (59)
= exp(ǫ′ − δ + ln(ν1(x′1))− ln(ν2(β(x′1))))ν2(β(x′1)) (60)
≤ exp(ǫ′)ν2(β(x′1)) (61)
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Line 59 follows from the fact that for every x′1 ∈ Supp(ν1),
ν1(x
′
1)/ν2(β(x
′
1)) = exp(ln(ν1(x
′
1)))/ exp(ln(ν2(β(x
′
1))))
Line 61 follows since for every x′1 ∈ Supp(ν1), | ln ν1(x′1)− ln ν2(β(x′1))| ≤ δ implies that ln ν1(x′1)−
ln ν2(β(x
′
1)) ≤ δ.
Thus, ∑
x′
1
∈Supp(ν1)
ν1(x
′
1) exp(ǫ
′ − δ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, β(x′1)〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (62)
≤
∑
x′
1
∈Supp(ν1)
exp(ǫ′)ν2(β(x
′
1)) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, β(x′1)〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (63)
=
∑
x′
2
∈Supp(ν2)
exp(ǫ′)ν2(x
′
2) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′2〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (64)
= exp(ǫ′)
∑
x′
2
∈S⊥
ν2(x
′
2) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′2〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (65)
Line 64 follows from the fact that β is a bijection from Supp(ν1) to Supp(ν2).
E.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Below we prove that Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e ] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x2〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e ]. Proving the reverse
that Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x2〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e ] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e ] is much the same reversing the roles of
x1 and x2 and using β
−1 in the place of β.
Proof by induction over the structures of ~e and ~i.
Case: ~e = [ ]. In this case,
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x1〉K(~i)⌋E ⊒ [ ] ] = 1 ≤ exp(ǫ) ∗ 1 = exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x2〉K(~i)⌋E ⊒ [ ] ]
Case: x1 has no outgoing transitions and ~e 6= [ ]. In this case, Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e ] = 0 ≤
exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x2〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e ].
Henceforth, we only consider x1 with at least one out going transition. Since x1 is related to
x2, we know it must also have at least one out going transition. Thus, neither x1 nor x2 can be ⊥.
Thus, we use s1 for x1 and s2 for x2 for the reminder of the proof.
Case: ~e = q:~e′ and ~i = [ ] for some q ∈ Q. In this case,
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] =
∑
~a∈γ(q:~e′)
Pr[ J〈L, s1〉K(~i)⊒~a ] =
∑
~a∈γ(q:~e′)
∑
s′
1
∈S
〈L, s1〉(~i)(~a, s′1)
Since ~e 6= [ ], [ ] is not in γ(~e). Furthermore, all ~a in γ(~e) must have q come before any other action of
E. In particular, ~a must have either the form q:~a′, d:~a′, or h:~a′ for some ~a ∈ A∗, d ∈ D, and h ∈ H.
Since s1 is H-disabled by being in the unwinding relation, we know that for no h ∈ H and µ does
s1
h→µ. These factors combine to mean that 〈L, s1〉([ ])(~a, s′1) = 0 for all s′1 ∈ S and ~a ∈ γ(~e). Thus,
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K([ ])⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] = 0. The same reasoning concludes that Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s2〉K([ ])⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] = 0
making Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K([ ])⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s2〉K([ ])⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] since 0 ≤ exp(ǫ)0
Case: ~e = r:~e′ and ~i = [ ] for some r ∈ R. We consider the following subcases:
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• Subcase: s1 r→µ for some µ. Since s1 and s2 are related, there exists µ2 such that s2 r→µ2.
This implies that there exists ν1 and ν2 such that s1
r⇒ ν1 and s2 r⇒ ν2. Since s1 Rǫ s2,
there exists δ in [0, ǫ] such that ν1 L(Rǫ−δ, δ) ν2. This implies there exists a bijection β
from Supp(ν1) to Supp(ν2) such that for all x1 ∈ Supp(ν1), x1Rǫ−δβ(x2) and | ln ν1(x1) −
ln ν2(β(x1))| ≤ δ. Thus, we may apply the inductive hypothesis to ~i and ~e′ to get for all x1
in Supp(ν1), Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ] ≤ exp(ǫ− δ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, β(x′1)〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ]. Thus,
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] (66)
=
∑
x′
1
∈S⊥
ν1(x
′
1) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (67)
=
∑
x′
1
∈Supp(ν1)
ν1(x
′
1) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (68)
≤
∑
x′
1
∈Supp(ν1)
ν1(x
′
1) exp(ǫ− δ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, β(x′1)〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (69)
≤ exp(ǫ)
∑
x′
2
∈S⊥
ν2(x
′
2) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′2〉K(~i)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (70)
= exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s2〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] (71)
Lines 67 and 71 follow from Proposition 11. Line 69 follows from the inductive hypothesis
Line 70 follows Proposition 15.
• Subcase: s1 r
′→µ for some output r′ 6= r. Since s1 and s2 are related, there exists µ2 such that
s2
r′→µ2. Furthermore, for no other action a 6= r′ does does s1 a→µ′ or s2 a→µ′ for any µ′. Recall
that Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] =
∑
~a∈γ(r:~e′) Pr[ J〈L, s1〉K(~i)⊒~a ] =
∑
~a∈γ(r:~e′)
∑
s′
1
∈S〈L, s1〉(~i)(~a, s′1).
For all ~a ∈ γ(r:~e′), its first element from E must be r and, thus, it cannot start with r′. How-
ever, s can only transition under r′ and ~a 6= [ ], meaning there must be a transition for ~a to be
produced. Thus, for all such ~a and s′1, 〈L, s1〉(~i)(~a, s′1) = 0 and Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] = 0.
Similar reasoning concludes that Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s2〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] = 0. Thus, Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] =
0 ≤ exp(ǫ) ∗ 0 = exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s2〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] as needed.
• Subcase: s1 is an input accepting state and ~i = [ ]. Recall that
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] =
∑
~a∈γ(r:~e′)
∑
s′
1
∈S
〈L, s1〉(~i)(~a, s′1)
Since ~a cannot be [ ],~i = [ ], and s1 is an input accepting state, this means that 〈L, s1〉(~i)(~a, s′1) =
0 for all such ~a and s′1. Thus, Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] = 0.
Since s1 is input accepting and related to s2, s2 must also be input accepting. Thus, by
similar reasoning Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] = 0 and the results holds as above.
• Subcase: s1 is an input accepting state and ~i = q:~i for some q ∈ Q. Since ~e = r:~e′, no
~a ∈ γ(~e) can have q come before r. Thus, much as above Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] = 0 =
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ].
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• Subcase: s1 is an input accepting state and ~i = d:~i′ for some d ∈ D. Since s1 is in-
put accepting and related to s2, s2 must also be input accepting. Thus, there exist ν1
and ν2 such that s1
d⇒ ν1 and s2 d⇒ ν2. Since s1 Rǫ s2, there exists δ in [0, ǫ] such that
ν1 L(Rǫ−δ, δ) ν2. This implies there exists a bijection β from Supp(ν1) to Supp(ν2) such that
for all x1 ∈ Supp(ν1), x1Rǫ−δβ(x2) and | ln ν1(x1)−ln ν2(β(x1))| ≤ δ. Thus, we may apply the
inductive hypothesis to ~i′ and r:~e′ to get for all x1 in Supp(ν1), Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′1〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] ≤
exp(ǫ− δ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, β(x′1)〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ]. Thus,
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(d:~i′)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] (72)
=
∑
x′
1
∈S⊥
ν1(x
′
1) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′1〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] (73)
=
∑
x′
1
∈Supp(ν1)
ν1(x
′
1) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′1〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] (74)
≤
∑
x′
1
∈Supp(ν1)
ν1(x
′
1) exp(ǫ− δ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, β(x′1)〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] (75)
≤ exp(ǫ)
∑
x′
2
∈S⊥
ν2(x
′
2) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′2〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] (76)
= exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s2〉K(d:~i)⌋E⊒r:~e′ ] (77)
Lines 73 and 77 follow from Proposition 11. Line 75 follows from the inductive hypothesis
Line 76 follows Proposition 15.
Case: ~e = q:~e′ and ~i = i:~i′ for some i in I and ~i′ in I∗. We consider the following subcases:
• Subcase: s1 is not an input accepting state: there exists no µ1 such that s1 q→µ1. Since s1 and
s2 are related, there also cannot exist a µ2 such that s2
q→µ2. Since s1 does have a transition
and is H-disabled, there must exist some response r such that s1
r→µ′1 and s2 r→µ′2 for some
µ′1 and µ
′
2. Furthermore, s1 and s2 transitions under no other actions. Recall that
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(i:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] =
∑
~a∈γ(q:~e′)
Pr[ J〈L, s1〉K(i:~i′)⊒~a ]
=
∑
~a∈γ(q:~e′)
∑
s′
1
∈S
〈L, s1〉(i:~i′)(~a, s′1)
For all ~a ∈ γ(q:~e′), its first element from E must be q and, thus, it cannot start with r. How-
ever, s can only transition under r and ~a 6= [ ], meaning there must be a transition for ~a to be
produced. Thus, for all such ~a and s′1, 〈L, s1〉(~i)(~a, s′1) = 0 and Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(i:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] = 0.
Similar reasoning concludes that Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s2〉K(i:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] = 0. Thus,
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(i:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] ≤ exp(ǫ) ∗ 0 = exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s2〉K(q:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ]
as needed.
• Subcase: s1 is an input accepting state and i = q for some µ1. Since s1 is input accepting,
s1
q→µ1 for some µ1. Since s1 and s2 are related, there exists µ2 such that s2 q→µ2. This
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implies that there exists ν1 and ν2 such that s1
q⇒ ν1 and s2 q⇒ ν2. Since s1 Rǫ s2, there exists
δ in [0, ǫ] such that ν1 L(Rǫ−δ, δ) ν2. This implies there exists a bijection β from Supp(ν1)
to Supp(ν2) such that for all x1 ∈ Supp(ν1), x1Rǫ−δβ(x2) and | ln ν1(x1) − ln ν2(β(x1))| ≤ δ.
Thus, we may apply the inductive hypothesis to ~i′ and ~e′ to get for all x1 in Supp(ν1),
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′1〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒~e′ ] ≤ exp(ǫ− δ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, β(x′1)〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒~e′ ]. Thus,
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(q:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] (78)
=
∑
x′
1
∈S⊥
ν1(x
′
1) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′1〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (79)
=
∑
x′
1
∈Supp(ν1)
ν1(x
′
1) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′1〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (80)
≤
∑
x′
1
∈Supp(ν1)
ν1(x
′
1) exp(ǫ− δ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, β(x′1)〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (81)
≤ exp(ǫ)
∑
x′
2
∈S⊥
ν2(x
′
2) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′2〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒~e′ ] (82)
= exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s2〉K(q:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] (83)
Lines 79 and 83 follow from Proposition 11. Line 81 follows from the inductive hypothesis
Line 82 follows Proposition 15.
• Subcase: s1 is input accepting, i 6= q, and i ∈ Q. Recall that
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(i:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] =
∑
~a∈γ(q:~e′)
Pr[ J〈L, s1〉K(i:~i′)⊒~a ]
=
∑
~a∈γ(q:~e′)
∑
s′
1
∈S
〈L, s1〉(i:~i′)(~a, s′1)
For all ~a ∈ γ(q:~e′), its first element from E must be q and, thus, it cannot start with
i. Thus, for all such ~a and s′1, 〈L, s1〉(i:~i′)(~a, s′1) = 0 and Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(i:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] =
0. Similar reasoning allows us to conclude that Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s2〉K(i:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] = 0. Thus,
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(i:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] = 0 ≤ exp(ǫ) ∗ 0 = exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s2〉K(q:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] as needed.
• Subcase: s1 is input accepting, i 6= q, and i ∈ D. We use d to denote i. Since s1 is
input accepting and related to s2, s2 must also be input accepting. Thus, there exist ν1
and ν2 such that s1
d⇒ ν1 and s2 d⇒ ν2. Since s1 Rǫ s2, there exists δ in [0, ǫ] such that
ν1 L(Rǫ−δ, δ) ν2. This implies there exists a bijection β from Supp(ν1) to Supp(ν2) such that
for all x1 ∈ Supp(ν1), x1Rǫ−δβ(x2) and | ln ν1(x1)−ln ν2(β(x1))| ≤ δ. Thus, we may apply the
inductive hypothesis to ~i′ and q:~e′ to get for all x1 in Supp(ν1), Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′1〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] ≤
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exp(ǫ− δ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, β(x′1)〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ]. Thus,
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s1〉K(d:~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] (84)
=
∑
x′
1
∈S⊥
ν1(x
′
1) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′1〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] (85)
=
∑
x′
1
∈Supp(ν1)
ν1(x
′
1) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′1〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] (86)
≤
∑
x′
1
∈Supp(ν1)
ν1(x
′
1) exp(ǫ− δ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, β(x′1)〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] (87)
≤ exp(ǫ)
∑
x′
2
∈S⊥
ν2(x
′
2) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x′2〉K(~i′)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] (88)
= exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s2〉K(d:~i)⌋E⊒q:~e′ ] (89)
Lines 85 and 89 follow from Proposition 11. Line 87 follows from the inductive hypothesis
Line 88 follows Proposition 15.
E.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We use Lemma 12 and strengthen the hypothesis to show that for all reachable states s and ~e,
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⌋E⊒~e ] =
∑
~a∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⊒~a ]
≤ exp(ǫ)
∑
~a∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⊒~a ]
= exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⌋E⊒~e ]
Arbitrarily fix ~i1 and ~i2 such that ∆(~i1,~i2) = 1. We use induction over the structures of ~i1, ~i2, and
~e.
Case: ~e = [ ]. In this case, γ(~e) = {[ ]} and Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⌋E⊒[ ] ] = 1 ≤ exp(ǫ) ∗ 1 =
exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⌋E⊒[ ] ] irrespective of ~i1 and ~i2.
Only in the case where ~e = [ ], can [ ] be in γ(~e). Thus, we assume that ~e 6= [ ] in the reminder
of this proof.
Case: ~i1 = [ ] and ~i2 = [ ]. Pr[ J〈L, s〉K([ ])⊒~a ] = Pr[ J〈L, s〉K([ ])⊒~a ] for all ~a ∈ γ(~e) for any ~e.
Case: ~i1 = d:~i
′
1 and ~i2 = d:~i
′
2. We consider three mutually exclusive subcases:
• Subcase: s d→µ. For all ~a such that for no ~a′, ~a = d:~a′, Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⊒~a ] = 0 = Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⊒~a ].
Since such ~a add nothing to the summations, we may ignore them and limit our attention to
~a = d:~a′ in γ(~e). Note that all such ~a′ are in γ(~e) iff d:~a′ is in γ(~e).
All the states in Supp(µ) are reachable. Thus, for each state s′ in Supp(µ), we may apply the
inductive hypothesis on ~i′1, ~i
′
2, and ~e to get that∑
~a′∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i′1)⊒~a′ ] ≤ exp(ǫ)
∑
~a′∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i′2)⊒~a′ ]
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Considering the sum over all such ~a, we get∑
~a∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⊒~a ] (90)
=
∑
d:~a′∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⊒d:~a′ ] (91)
=
∑
~a′∈γ(~e)
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′) Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i′1)⊒~a′ ] (92)
=
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′)
∑
~a′∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i′1)⊒~a′ ] (93)
=
∑
s′∈Supp(µ)
µ(s′)
∑
~a′∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i′1)⊒~a′ ] (94)
≤
∑
s′∈Supp(µ)
µ(s′) exp(ǫ)
∑
~a′∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i′2)⊒~a′ ] (95)
= exp(ǫ)
∑
~a′∈γ(~e)
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′) Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i′2)⊒~a′ ] (96)
= exp(ǫ)
∑
d:~a′∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⊒d:~a′ ] (97)
= exp(ǫ)
∑
~a∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⊒~a ] (98)
where d:~a′ in the expression d:~a′ ∈ γ(~e) ranges over only those elements of γ(~e) of the form
d:~a′. That is,
∑
d:~a′∈γ(~e) is shorthand for ∑
d:~a′∈{~a′′∈γ(~e) | ∃~a′∈A∗ s.t. d:~a′=~a′′ }
Note that the last line follows from the fact that J〈L, s〉K(~i2)(~a) = 0 for all ~a not of the form
d:~a′. Lines 92 and 97 follow from Proposition 9. Line 95 follows from the inductive hypothesis.
• Subcase: s r→µ for some r ∈ R. For all ~a such that for no ~a′, ~a = r:~a′, Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⊒~a ] =
0 = Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⊒~a ]. Since such ~a add nothing to the summations, we may ignore them
and limit our attention to r:~a′ in γ(~e). Unless ~e = r:~e′ for some ~e′, no such r:~a′ will be in γ(~e)
and both summations will be zero. Thus, we limit our attention to the case where ~e = r:~e′
for some ~e′. In this case, we may use the inductive hypothesis on ~i1, ~i2, and ~e
′ to get that for
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all s′ ∈ Supp(µ), ∑~a′∈γ(~e′) Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i1)⊒~a′ ] ≤ exp(ǫ)∑~a′∈γ(~e′) Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i2)⊒~a′ ]. Thus,∑
~a∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⊒~a ] (99)
=
∑
r:~a′∈γ(r:~e′)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⊒r:~a′ ] (100)
=
∑
~a′∈γ(~e′)
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′) Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i1)⊒~a′ ] (101)
=
∑
s′∈Supp(µ)
µ(s′)
∑
~a′∈γ(~e′)
Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i1)⊒~a′ ] (102)
≤
∑
s′∈Supp(µ)
µ(s′) exp(ǫ)
∑
~a′∈γ(~e′)
Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i2)⊒~a′ ] (103)
= exp(ǫ)
∑
~a′∈γ(~e′)
∑
s′∈S
µ(s′) Pr[ J〈L, s′〉K(~i2)⊒~a′ ] (104)
= exp(ǫ)
∑
r:~a′∈γ(r:~e′)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⊒r:~a′ ] (105)
= exp(ǫ)
∑
~a∈γ(~e)
Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⊒~a ] (106)
Lines 101 and 105 follow from Proposition 9. Line 103 follows from the inductive hypothesis.
• Subcase: Otherwise. Since s is H-disabled, it is not the case that s h→µ for any µ or h ∈ H.
Since ~a 6= [ ], Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⊒~a ] = 0 = Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⊒~a ] for all ~a ∈ γ(~e).
Case: ~i1 = q:~i
′
1 and ~i2 = q:~i
′
2. Much as above just using that ~a is only in γ(~e) if ~e = q:~e
′ for
some ~e′ and ~a′ ∈ γ(~e′).
Case: ~i2 = d:~i1. We consider the following subcases:
• Subcase: s d→µ. Since s d→µ, for some ν, s d⇒ ν. Since s is reachable from s0, there exists an
ǫ-unwinding relation Rǫ that covers s and d. That is, for all s′ ∈ Supp(ν), for all s′ ∈ Supp(ν),
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s Rǫ s′ and ν(⊥) = 0.
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K⌋E(~i1)⊒~e ] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, smin〉K⌋E(~i1)⊒~e ] (107)
= exp(ǫ)

∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x)

Pr[ ⌊J〈L, smin〉K(~i1)⌋E⊒~e ] (108)
= exp(ǫ)
(∑
s′∈S
ν(s′)
)
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, smin〉K(~i1)⌋E⊒~e ] (109)
≤ exp(ǫ)
∑
s′∈S
ν(s′) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s′〉K(~i1)⌋E⊒~e ] (110)
= exp(ǫ)
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i1)⌋E⊒~e ] (111)
= exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(d:~i1)⌋E⊒~e ] (112)
= exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⌋E⊒~e ] (113)
where smin is the state s
′ ∈ Supp(ν) that minimizes Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s′〉K(~i1)⌋E⊒~e ]. Line 107 follows
from Lemma 1. Line 108 follows from Proposition 7. Lines 109 and 111 follow from ν(⊥) = 0.
Line 112 follows from Proposition 11.
• Subcase: s r→µ for some r. As in the corresponding subcase in the case for ~i1 = d:~i′1 and
~i2 = d:~i
′
2, we may ignore ~a not of the form ~a = r:~a
′ and ~e not of the form r:~e′. In this case,
we may use the inductive hypothesis on ~i1, ~i2, and ~e
′ as before to get the required result.
• Subcase: Otherwise. Since s does not transition under d in this case and the automaton has
quasi-input enabling, it does not transition under any input action. Further, s is H-disabled.
Thus, since ~a 6= [ ], Pr[ J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⊒~a ] = 0 for all ~a ∈ γ(~e).
Case: ~i1 = d:~i2. We consider the following subcases.
• Subcase: s d→µ. Since s d→µ, for some ν, s d⇒ ν. Since s is reachable from s0, there exists an
ǫ-unwinding relation Rǫ that covers s and d. That is, for all s′ ∈ Supp(ν), for all s′ ∈ Supp(ν),
s Rǫ s′ and ν(⊥) = 0.
Thus,
Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i1)⌋E⊒~e ] = Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(d:~i2)⌋E⊒~e ] (114)
=
∑
x∈S⊥
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i2)⌋E⊒~e ] (115)
=
∑
x∈Supp(ν)
ν(x) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, x〉K(~i2)⌋E⊒~e ] (116)
≤
∑
x∈Supp(ν)
ν(x) exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⌋E⊒~e ] (117)
=

 ∑
x∈Supp(ν)
ν(x)

 exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⌋E⊒~e ] (118)
= exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⌋E⊒~e ] (119)
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Line 115 follows from Proposition 11. Line 117 follows from Lemma 1. Line 119 follows from
Proposition 7.
• Subcase: s r→µ for some r. As above in the other subcases for s r→µ.
• Subcase: Otherwise. In the case where s d→µ for no µ and ~a 6= [ ], everything is 0, which is
lower than any possible value of exp(ǫ) Pr[ ⌊J〈L, s〉K(~i2)⌋E⊒~e ].
F Proof of Lemma 2: Mex1(K) has an Unwinding Family
To prove Lemma 2, arbitrarily fix a state s and data point d. We use proof by induction over j
from 0 to t to show that for each pair of states s1 and s2 such that s1 R2jǫs,d s2, they have the needed
properties.
In both the base or inductive cases, since s1 R2jǫs,d s2, s2 must have the same value for the PC as
s1. Thus, they have the same set of enabled actions. That is, there exists a µ1 such that s1
a→µ1
iff there exists a µ2 such that s2
a→µ2. Thus, s1 a⇒ ν1 iff s2 a⇒ ν2.
Base Case: j = 0. For states with a PC of 08, the properties follows from the related states
being equal.
For states with a PC of 16, we can prove the needed properties using δ = 0 as we must since
R0s,d is a 0-unwinding relation. Since j = 0 and s1 R2jǫs,d s2, s1 must have the form
〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′t−1〉, 〈n0, . . . , n′t−1〉, c′, y′, r′, k′〉. Since s1 is related to another state, it must be in St1.
Thus, s1 is reachable in t queries and c
′ = c+(t−1). Once curSlot is updated by line 17, it will roll
over to the value of c. Thus, s1
r′⇒Dirac(s′1) where s′1 = 〈08, 〈B′′0 , . . . , B′′t−1〉, 〈n′′0 , . . . , n′′t−1〉, c, y′, r′, k′〉)
where B′′c = { } , n′′c = 0, and for all c′′ 6= c, B′′c′′ = B′c′′ and n′′c′′ = n′c′′ . Since the cth slot was
holding the data point by which s1 and add(s1, c, d) differ and s1 differs from swap(s1, c, d, d
′) for
each value of d′, add(s1, c, d)
r′⇒Dirac(s′1) and swap(s1, c, d, d′) r
′⇒Dirac(s′1) for all d′. We use β that
maps s′1 to itself and nothing else to anything. Furthermore, for the one state s
′
1 in Supp(ν1),
| ln ν1(s′1) − ln ν2(β(s′1))| = 0 = δ. Thus, ν1 L(=, 0) ν2 where equality is trivially a 0-unwinding
relation.
Inductive Case: j > 0. We consider cases depending on what type of action a is to show that
there exists δ in [0, 2jǫ] such that µ1 L(R2jǫ−δs,d , δ) µ2:
• Subcase: a ∈ D. In this case, we prove that such a δ exists using δ = 0. That is, we prove
that ν1 L(R2jǫs,d , 0) ν2. Since a ∈ D, s1 has must have the form
〈08, 〈B′0, . . . , B′t−1〉, 〈n′0, . . . n′t−1〉, c′, y′, r′, k′〉
We consider subsubcases:
– Subsubcase: c = c′ and nc′ < v − 1. In this case, both states s1 and s2 will store
the data point a. For that c′, ν1 = Dirac(〈08, ~B′′, ~n′′, c′, a, r′, k′〉) where B′′c′ = B′c′ ⊎
{a}, n′′c′ = n′c′ + 1, and for all c′′ 6= c′, B′′c′′ = B′c′′ and n′′c′′ = n′c′′ . Similarly, ν2 =
Dirac(〈08, 〈 ~B′′′, ~n′′′, c′, a, r′, k′〉) where either
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1. B′′′c′ = Bc′⊎{d}⊎{a}, n′′′c′ = n′c′+2, and for all c 6= c′′ 6= c′, B′′′c′′ = B′c′′ and n′′′c′′ = n′c′′ ;
or
2. B′′′c′ = Bc′ ⊎ {d} − {d′} ⊎ {a}, n′′′c′ = n′c′ + 2, and for all c 6= c′′ 6= c′, B′′′c′′ = B′c′′ and
n′′′c′′ = n
′
c′′ for some d
′.
Thus, for s′1 ∈ Supp(ν1) and s′2 ∈ Supp(ν2), s′2 is either add(s′1, c, d) or swap(s′1, c, d, d′)
for some d′.
To show that µ1 L(Rǫ′s,d, 0) µ2, we use the function β that maps s′1 to the state s′2
and nothing else. Since both ν1 and ν2 are Dirac distributions, that covers all of their
supports and is a bijection. It follows from s′2 being either add(s
′
1, c, d) of swap(s
′
1, c, d, d
′)
for some d′ that s′1 R2jǫs,d s′2. Lastly, | ln ν1(s′1)− ln ν2(s′2)| = | ln 1− ln 1| = 0 ≤ δ
– Subsubcase: c 6= c′ and nc′ < v. Mostly, as above.
– Subsubcase: nc′ = v. In this case, both states s1 and s2 will drop the data point a and
not store it. For that c′, ν1 = Dirac(s1) and ν2 = Dirac(s2) By assumption, s1 R2jǫs,d s2.
| ln ν1(s1)− ln ν2(s2)| = | ln 1− ln 1| = 0 ≤ δ
– Subsubcase: c = c′ and nc′ = v − 1. If s2 = swap(s1, c, d, d′) for some d′, then this
subsubcase is the same as the first one. Otherwise, the s1 will store the data point,
but s2 = add(s1, c, d) will not since it already has nc′ + 1 = v data points. Thus, ν2 =
Dirac(s2) and ν1 = Dirac(s
′
1) where s
′
1 = 〈08, 〈B′′0 , . . . , B′′t−1〉, 〈n′′1 , . . . , n′′t−1〉, c′, a, r′, k′〉)
where B′′c′ = B
′
c′ ⊎{a}, n′′c′ = n′c′+1, and for all c′′ 6= c′, B′′c′′ = B′c′′ and n′′c′′ = n′c′′. Thus,
we have that s2 = swap(s
′
1, c, d, a). Thus, s
′
1 R2jǫs,d s2. We use β that maps s′1 to s2 and
nothing else. Since | ln ν1(s1)− ln ν2(s2)| = 0, ν1 L(R2jǫs,d,d′ , 0) ν2.
• Subcase: a ∈ R. In this case, we prove that such a δ exists using δ = 0. That is, we prove
that ν1 L(R2jǫs,d , 0) ν2.
Since a ∈ R, s1 must have the form 〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′t−1〉, 〈n0, . . . , n′t−1〉, c′, y′, r′, k′〉. Thus,
s1
a⇒Dirac(s′1) where
s′1 = 〈08, 〈B′′0 , . . . , B′′t−1〉, 〈n′′0 , . . . , n′′t−1〉, c′ + 1 mod t, y′, r′, k′〉)
where B′′c+1 mod t = { } , n′′c+1 mod t = 0, and for all c′′ 6= c + 1 mod t, B′′c′′ = B′c′′ and
n′′c′′ = n
′
c′′ .
If s2 = add(s1, c, d), then s2
r⇒Dirac(s′2) where
s′2 = 〈16, 〈B′′0 , . . . , B′′t−1〉, 〈n′′0 , . . . n′′t−1〉c′ + 1 mod t, y′, r′, k′〉)
where B′′c+1 mod t = { } , B′′c = B′c ⊎ {d}, n′′c+1 mod t = 0, and for all c′′ 6= c + 1 mod t,
B′′c′′ = B
′
c′′ and n
′′
c′′ = n
′
c′′ . Since j > 0, c + (t − j) mod t 6= c. Thus, the slot by which s1
differs from s2 will remain unchanged, and s
′
1 = add(s
′
2, c, d).
By similar reasoning, if s2 = swap(s1, c, d, d
′) for some d′, s′1 = swap(s
′
2, c, d, d
′). Thus, either
way, s′1 R2jǫs,d s′2. β that maps the one state of Supp(ν1) to the one state of Supp(ν2) shows
that ν1 L(R2jǫs,d , 0) ν2 since | lnµ1(s′1)− lnµ2(add(s′1, c, d))| = | ln 1− ln 1| = 0 ≤ δ.
• Subcase: a ∈ Q. In this case, we prove that such a δ exists using δ = 2ǫ. That is, we prove
that ν1 L(R2jǫ−2ǫs,d , 2ǫ) ν2. In this case, s1 has the form 〈08, 〈B′1, . . . , B′t〉, c′, y′, r′, k′〉. ν1 is
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such that
ν1(〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′t−1〉, 〈n′0, . . . n′t−1〉, c′, a, r′′, κa〉) = Pr
[
κa
(
t−1⊎
ℓ=0
B′ℓ
)
= r′′
]
and ν1(s
′
1) = 0 for all other states s
′
1. ν2 is either such that
ν2(〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′c ⊎ {d}, . . . B′t−1〉, 〈n′0, . . . n′c + 1, . . . n′t−1〉, c′, a, r′′, κa〉)
= Pr
[
κa
(
t−1⊎
ℓ=0
B′ℓ ⊎ {d}
)
= r′′
]
or
ν2(〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′c ⊎ {d} − {d′}, . . . B′t−1〉, 〈n′0, . . . n′t−1〉, c′, a, r′′, κa〉)
= Pr
[
κa
(
t−1⊎
ℓ=0
B′ℓ ⊎ {d} − {d′}
)
= r′′
]
for some d′ and ν1(s
′
2) = 0 for all other states s
′
2. Let B denote which of
⊎t−1
ℓ=0B
′
ℓ ⊎ {d} and⊎t−1
ℓ=0B
′
ℓ ⊎{d}−{d′} it is. Either way
⊎t−1
ℓ=0B
′
ℓ and B differ by at most two elements Since κa
has ǫ-differential privacy, we know that for any r′′,
Pr
[
κa
(
t−1⊎
ℓ=0
B′ℓ
)
= r′′
]
≤ exp(2ǫ) ∗ Pr [κa(B) = r′′]
Thus,
ν1(〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′t−1〉, c′, a, r′′, κa〉)
≤ exp(2ǫ) ∗ ν2(〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′c ⊎ {d}, . . . B′t−1〉, c′, a, r′′, κa〉) (120)
and
ν1(〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′t−1〉, c′, a, r′′, κa〉)
≤ exp(2ǫ) ∗ ν2(〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′c ⊎ {d} − {d′}, . . . B′t−1〉, c′, a, r′′, κa〉) (121)
Similarly,
ν2(〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′c ⊎ {d}, . . . B′t−1〉, c′, a, r′′, κa〉)
≤ exp(2ǫ) ∗ ν1(〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′t−1〉, c′, a, r′′, κa〉) (122)
and
ν2(〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′c ⊎ {d} − {d′}, . . . B′t−1〉, c′, a, r′′, κa〉)
≤ exp(2ǫ) ∗ ν1(〈16, 〈B′0, . . . , B′t−1〉, c′, a, r′′, κa〉) (123)
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isInLiftedRelation(S⊥,R, δ, ν1, ν2)
VL := {}
VR := {}
E := {}
for all x1 ∈ S⊥
if ν1(x1) > 0,
add x1 to VL
for all x2 ∈ S⊥
if ν2(x2) > 0,
add x2 to VR
for all x1 ∈ VL
for all x2 ∈ VR
if(x1Rx2 and | ln ν1(x1)− ln ν2(x2)| ≤ δ)
add edge 〈x1, x2〉 to E
return HopcroftKarpHasPerfectMatching(〈VL, VR, E〉)
Figure 5: Algorithm for checking δ-approximate lifting of relations.
To show that ν1 L(R2jǫ−2ǫs,d , 2ǫ) ν2, we use a function β. In the case where s2 = add(s1, c, d), β
maps each state s′1 of Supp(µ1) to add(s
′
1, c, d). To show that β is a bijection from Supp(µ1)
to Supp(µ2) note that add(·, c, d) is a bijection and that Lines 120 and 122 imply that s′1 is
in Supp(µ1) iff add(s
′
1, c, d) is in Supp(µ2).
In the case where s2 = swap(s1, c, d, d
′), β maps each s′1 to swap(s
′
1, c, d, d
′). To show that
β is a bijection from Supp(µ1) to Supp(µ2) note that swap(·, c, d, d′) is a bijection and that
Lines 121 and 123 imply that s′1 is in Supp(µ1) iff swap(s
′
1, c, d, d
′) is in Supp(µ2).
Since R2(j−1)ǫs,d = R2jǫ−2ǫs,d , for all r′′, s′1 R2jǫ−2ǫs,d β(s′1). Furthermore, for all s′1 in Supp(µ1),
| ln µ1(s′1)− lnµ2(β(s′1))| ≤ ǫ ≤ 2ǫ ≤ δ from Lines 120, 121, 122, and 123.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Since R2j∗ǫs,d covers s and d for all states s and data points d of the automaton Mex1, Lemma 2
and Theorem 2 together prove that the automaton has (2t ∗ ǫ)-differential noninterference.
G The isInLiftedRelation Algorithm
The reduction used by isInLiftedRelation is shown in Figure 5. First the algorithm constructs
the bipartite graph for the reduction and then uses the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm [HK73]. This
algorithm returns if and only if there exists a perfect matching M for the graph. A perfect matching
M for a bipartite graph 〈VL, VR, E〉 is a subset of E such that for every vertex v ∈ V = VL ∪ VR is
incident to exactly one edge in M .
(Since Supp(ν1) and Supp(ν2) might not be disjoint, but VL and VR must be disjoint, we should
tag the states x1 and x2 differently before adding them to the sets. However, for readability, we do
not explicitly do this tagging.)
Proposition 16. For all sets S, relations R over S, non-negative reals δ, and distributions ν1 and
ν2 over S, isInLiftedRelation(S,R, δ, ν1, ν2) returns true iff ν1 L(R, δ) ν2.
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Proof. By the correctness of the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm, HopcroftKarpHasPerfectMatching
(and, thus, isInLiftedRelation) will only return true if there exists a perfect matching M for
the graph.
To prove only-if direction, assume that such an M exists. Given a perfect matching M of
bipartite graph, for every x1 ∈ VL there exists a unique edge e ∈ E such that there exists a x2 ∈ VR
such that e = 〈x1, x2〉. For each such x1, denote the unique x2 paired with it by this edge as
βM (x1). βM is a function from VL to VR since for every x1 ∈ VL, there exists exactly one such edge
and, thus, exactly one such x2, which must be in VR since the graph is bipartite. Furthermore, βM
is a bijection since every x2 in VR must be incident to exactly one edge in the perfect matching M .
Since VL = Supp(ν1) and VR = Supp(ν2), βM is a bijection from Supp(ν1) to Supp(ν2). Since x1
and βM (x1) are connected by an edge, x1 R βM (x1) and | ln ν1(x1)− ln ν2(βM (x1))| ≤ δ. Thus, the
bijection βM is such that for all x1 ∈ Supp(ν1), x1 R βM (x1) and | ln ν1(x1) − ln ν2(βM (x1))| ≤ δ.
This implies that ν1 L(R, δ) ν2.
To prove the if-direction, assume that ν1 L(R, δ) ν2. Then there exists a bijection β from
Supp(ν1) to Supp(ν2) such that x1 R β(x1) and | ln ν1(x1) − ln ν2(β(x1))| ≤ δ. Let Mβ be the set
such that 〈x1, x2〉 ∈Mβ iff β(x1) = x2. Mβ is a subset of E since x1 ∈ Supp(ν1), β(x1) ∈ Supp(ν2),
x1 R β(x1), and | ln ν1(x1) − ln ν2(β(x1))| ≤ δ together imply that 〈x1, β(x1)〉 is in E. Mβ is a
perfect matching for the graph since β is a bijection from VL = Supp(ν1) to VR = Supp(ν2).
Proposition 17. isInLiftedRelation runs in O(|S|2.5) time.
Proof. Given that we know that we never will attempt to add a duplicate element to any of the
sets VL, VR, nor E, all the set operations may be done in constant time. Thus, constructing the
graph for the reduction operates in O(|S|2) time. The Hopcroft-Karp perfect matching algorithm
operates in O(
√
v ∗ e) time where v is the number of vertices and e, the number of edges. That is
lower than O(|S|2.5) since e ≤ v2 and v = |VL|+ |VR| ≤ 2 ∗ |S|. Thus, the whole algorithm runs in
O(|S|2.5) time.
H Proofs for the Checking Algorithm
Proof of Lemma 3: The Soundness of isUnwindFam. Here rel represents the relation family
R such that Rǫ is equal to rel[⌊ǫ/δ⌋] for ǫ such that 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ t ∗ δ. If such a family is an unwinding
family for transition system, then it is also one for the transition system with all the hidden states
have been converted to the same one.
We prove a stronger fact that implies that R is an (t ∗ δ)-unwinding family for the converted
transition system. Namely, we show that the algorithm will only return true if for all ǫ from
[0, tδ], for all x1 and x2 in S⊥ such that 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ rel[⌊ǫ/δ⌋], for all a in I ∪ R, there exists
ν1 such that x1
a⇒ ν1 iff there exists ν2 such that x2 a⇒ ν2, and when they do exist, either (1)
ν1 L(rel[⌊ǫ/δ⌋] − 0, 0) ν2 or (2) ν1 L(rel[⌊ǫ/δ⌋ − δ], δ) ν2. Condition (1) is satisfied if for all
〈x′1, x′2〉 ∈ rel[⌊ǫ/δ⌋], ν1(x′1) = ν(x′2). Condition (2) is satisfied if for all 〈x′1, x′2〉 ∈ rel[⌊ǫ/δ⌋ − δ],
| ln ν1(x′1)− ln ν(x′2)| ≤ δ.
The algorithm will only return true if none of the preceding return statements return false.
Firstly, it must be the case that |rel| = t + 1. Secondly, the outer most for loop must finish
executing without any of its return statements being reached. This will only happen if for all
values of i from the length of the array. For each such value, the algorithm examines the relation
rel[i], which is the relation used for all values of ǫ in [0, tδ] such that ⌊ǫ/δ⌋ is equal to i. Thus,
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by considering each value of i, the algorithm examines the intervals [0, δ), [δ, 2δ), and so on up to
[(t − 1)δ, tδ) and finally the point at tδ. Thus, it examines the whole range [0, tδ] as required by
the above condition.
Each of these examinations consists of looking at every pair of 〈x1, x2〉 in the relation rel[i],
and every action a in I ∪O. For each such action a and pair, the algorithm first returns false if it
is not the case that x1
a⇒ ν1 iff x2 a⇒ ν2 for some ν1 and ν2 since T [x1][a] is equal to nil only in the
case where x1
a⇒ ν1 for no ν1 (and likewise for x2).
If false was not returned, the algorithm checks if it was because ν1 and ν2 both exist. If this is
not the case, the examination finishes as nothing more must be shown for this state-action pair.
In the case where ν1 and ν2 do exist, we know that x1 and x2 are actual states and ⊥ since
T [⊥][a] = nil for all a. The examination then continues with the algorithm computing the values
of ν1 and ν2 such that x1
a⇒ ν1 and x2 a⇒ ν2 as described above, which is well defined since x1 and
x2 are actual states.
Next, it checks if ν1 L(rel[i], 0) ν2. isInLiftedRelation(S⊥, rel[i], 0, ν1, ν2) will return true
iff Condition (1) is satisfied. If Condition (1) is satisfied, the examination is complete and algorithm
does not return false on this execution of the loop’s body.
If Condition (1) is not satisfied, then algorithm next checks to see if Condition (2) holds. For
our restricted set of relation families, Condition (2) cannot hold if i is 0 and Condition (1) does not
hold. Thus, the next if statement. It uses isInLiftedRelation(S⊥, rel[i − 1], δ, ν1, ν2) to check
if Condition (2) holds. If any pair is not, the algorithm returns false. If Condition (2) is satisfied,
the examination is complete, and algorithm does not return false and this execution of the loop.
Thus, each execution of the loop will only complete without returning false if either Condition
(1) or Condition (2) holds. As the loop checks all the needed combinations of states and actions,
the algorithm will only return true if the stronger fact that implements R is an unwinding relation
is true.
Proof of Lemma 4: The Running Time of isUnwindFam. The conversion of all hidden actions
to the same one runs in O(|H| ∗ |S|).
The outer most loop runs over the whole length of rel. The next loop is over every pair in
rel[i] where rel[i] is a binary relation over states. Thus, there are at most |S|2 pairs in rel[i].
The next loop is over every action. Thus, the body of this loop will be executed O(t ∗ |S|2 ∗ |A|)
times.
This body consists of four parts. The first is a simple conditional taking constant time. The
second computes ν1 and ν2. This takes O(|H| ∗ |S|+ |S|3) time. Since the conversion of all hidden
actions to the same one takes |H| = 1, this is O(|S|3). The third is a calls isInLiftedRelation,
which takes O(|S|2.5) time. The forth is a conditional and another call to isInLiftedRelation
on rel[i − 1], which takes O(|S|2.5) time. Thus, body is O(|S|3) time and the whole loop is
O(t ∗ |A| ∗ |S|4).
The algorithm whole algorithm run in O(|H| ∗ |S|+ t ∗ |A| ∗ |S|4), which is O(t ∗ |A| ∗ |S|4) since
|H| ≤ |A|.
Proof of Theorem 4: The Soundness of isAllCovered. The algorithm will only return true
if none of the preceding return statements return false. That is, the outer most for loop must
finish executing without any of its return statements being reached. This will only happen if for
every reachable state s and every data point d, either T [s][d] = nil or each of the following is true:
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1. ν(⊥) = 0 and |Rels[s][d]| 6= t = 1;
2. for all states s′ such that s′ ∈ Supp(ν), 〈s, s′〉 ∈ Rels[s][d]; and
3. isUnwindFam(〈S, I,O, T 〉, Rels[s][d], δ, t) returns true
where s
d⇒ ν. In the case where T [s][d] = nil, the trivial relation family that consists of only empty
relations is a (t ∗ δ)-unwinding family for the automaton. In the case where T [s][d] 6= nil, the
three conditions above imply Rels[s][d] is a (t ∗ δ)-unwinding family for the automaton by using
Lemma 3 on the last condition. Either way, there exists a (t ∗ δ)-unwinding family that covers s
and d. Thus, the body of the loop will return false unless there exists such an unwinding family.
As the algorithm checks every reachable s for every d, the loop will not terminate without
returning false unless the conditions of Theorem 2 holds. Thus, the algorithm only returns true if
the automaton has (t ∗ δ)-differential noninterference.
Proof of Theorem 5: The Running Time of isAllCovered. Computing the reachable states
can be done in time O(|S|).
The outer most loop executes at most |S| times. The next loop executes at most |D| times. In
the case where T [s][d] 6= nil, the body takes O(S3) time to compute ν, O(|S|) for the inner loop,
and O(t∗ |A| ∗ |S|4) time for running the isUnwindFam algorithm (Lemma 4). Thus, the body takes
O(t ∗ |A| ∗ |S|4) time and the whole algorithm takes O(t ∗ |D| ∗ |A| ∗ |S|5) time.
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